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Orszula’s Death:  
Grief and Consolation in the Renaissance—The Treny of Jan Kochanowski 
 
 
 
 
Michael Tworek   
 
Abstract for Honors Thesis entitled “Orszula’s Death: Grief and Consolation in the 
Renaissance—the Treny of Jan Kochanowski 
 
In this thesis, I use the Treny, a late 16th
It is not an easy matter to reconstruct Kochanowski’s life. Few records concerning 
his daily life remain, outside his numerous poetic works. Yet in joining the intellectual 
ranks of the humanists, Kochanowski obviously devoted much of his early life to the 
study of the languages and literatures of Greco-Roman antiquity, the results of which 
echoed throughout the works of his maturity. Similarly, he knew and interacted with 
many of the same philosophical and religious movements that flourished throughout 
Renaissance Europe. Thus, my task in this thesis is primarily to use poetry as a 
biographical source; and my method is to develop historical contexts that help explain the 
sorts of sentiments and ideas that Kochanowski expressed in the Treny.  
 century collection of nineteen poems by 
the Polish humanist Jan Kochanowski, as a basis from which to reconstruct a historical 
narrative of his attempt at self-consolation over the death of his daughter and, in the 
process, reconsider our current understanding of the Renaissance in Europe. Until fairly 
recently, scholars have tended to view the Renaissance as a primarily Italian or western 
European phenomenon. Eastern Europe receives little mention in current academic 
discussions of the Renaissance. This thesis, however, will show that the Treny does offer 
compelling evidence that this view is mistaken, and that Jan Kochanowski is indeed an 
outstanding representative of cosmopolitan European culture in Poland. 
In the preface, I examine Kochanowski’s response to the death of his daughter 
and his subsequent grief as recorded in the first part of the Treny. In chapter one, I 
reconstruct a glimpse of his humanist education in Kraków, Königsberg, and Padua, 
thereby providing a context for comparison; with chapter two, I examine the influence of 
the humanist consolatory tradition on Kochanowski and the Treny, focusing on the roles 
that the writings of Cicero and Petrarch played within the work. With next two chapters, I 
look at Kochanowski’s reaction to and eventual rejection of humanist consolation in the 
Treny, specifically against the Classical philosophical concepts of wisdom and virtue. In 
the last chapter, I focus on Kochanowski’s virulent critique of Cicero, philosophy, and 
human knowledge and pride in the last part of the Treny for their roles in aggravating his 
grief. Finally in the epilogue, I consider Kochanowski’s eventual decision to reject his 
humanism and find consolation in blind obedience to the divine will of his now more 
reformed and sterner Christian God and faith, and elucidate the significance of 
Kochanowski’s story of personal grief within the larger picture of European Humanism.      
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Preface 
 
In 1579 on a country estate in Czarnolas near Warsaw, Orszula Kochanowska 
died suddenly. A little less than two years old, Orszula suffered the same tragic fate that 
befell so many other children throughout Europe. Illness, famine, war, or even “divine 
will” could cut both a child’s life and its parents’ happiness painfully short, making 
childhood a hazardous journey for children “in the centuries prior to the twentieth.”1 
Orszula’s death did not seem to occasion any great public notice from either the 
immediate or the larger community of her region, though she had been the daughter of a 
nobleman.2
Deeply saddened by the untimely loss of “his dearest daughter,” Kochanowski 
threw himself entirely into grieving for Orszula.
 No one came forth to offer her a public eulogy. Neither written public 
accounts describing the circumstances of her death nor her grave have survived the 
passage of time. Thus, the memory of Orszula’s life and death would likely have faded 
away had not the intense love and grief of her father, Jan Kochanowski, held on to it so 
dearly.  
3  “You are gone, my Orszula!” he cried 
out desperately.4
                                                 
1 Margaret L. King, The Death of the Child Valerio Marcello (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 1. 
 Choked by the sorrowful reality of her untimely departure, he could do 
nothing for Orszula but mourn her loss, honoring her memory with his tears. Even a year 
after her death, Kochanowski was still mourning Orszula’s death, grieving unremittingly 
2 Janusz Pelc, Kochanowski: Szczyt renesansu w literaturze polskiej (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
PWN, 2001), 525. 
3 Jan Kochanowski, “Dedication,” Treny: The Lamentations of Kochanowski, trans. Adam Czerniawski.  
(Oxford: European Humanities Research Centre of the University of Oxford, 2001), 2-3. 
4 Kochanowski, Treny, 2-3. 
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and uncontrollably beyond the limits permitted for the bereaved.5 The social 
consequences for such “unmanly” behavior could be severe. Excessive grief in a man 
would have “concerned his friends,” as well as his family, “who feared to be dishonored 
by his immoderate expression of sorrow.”6 Yet, regardless of what the potential 
repercussions might have been, they seemed neither to have concerned Kochanowski, nor 
to have tempered his sorrow. How could he forget Orszula, a child so full of every 
“virtue” and “maidenly gift,” from his racked mind, especially when grief over her death 
followed him everywhere?7 His mental anguish, he thought, must find understanding and 
release: Where then would this devastated father turn?8 In a manner typical of him as a 
humanist and a poet, Kochanowski turned to his pen and “scroll,” to record the emotional 
torments of his tragedy as well as explore his “uncommon” reaction to the death of a 
child.9 Completed and published in 1580, this testament would be his last gift to Orszula. 
Kochanowski’s touching tribute of paternal love for his dead child was a cycle of 
nineteen poems, written not in Latin but in the emerging vernacular—in Polish—and 
fittingly entitled Treny (Laments).10  This bereaved father would have never imagined 
that he, “driven by chance and my pervasive loss/ to compose laments,” would achieve 
perpetual “fame” for “these elegies,” the only testimony of his “unbearable grief” to both 
his contemporaries and to posterity.11
 
 
                                                 
5 John Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s Laments: A Definition of the Emotion of Grief,” in Studies in 
Russian and Polish Literature: In Honor of Wacław Lednicki (’S Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1962), 37.  
6 King, The Death of The Child, 148. 
7 Kochanowski, “Dedication,” Treny, 3. 
8 George W. McClure, Sorrow and Consolation in Italian Humanism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 4-6. 
9 Kochanowski, Treny, 35; Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s Laments,” 37. 
10 Pelc, Kochanowski, 525-526. 
11  Kochanowski, “Dedication,” Treny, 6-7. 
  
3 
Fig. 1. The First Page of Treny in Old Polish Script, 1580 
 
Source: Janusz Pelc, Kochanowski: Szczyt renesansu w literaturze polskiej (Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), 530. 
 
Inexplicable to him and others, Kochanowski’s grief found its uncompromising 
manifestation in the poetic and emotional beauty of his verses in Treny.12 It was one thing 
for him simply to describe the pains of grief, ultimately failing to convey to readers their 
effects on him, yet it was quite another to speak of its cruelty in a manner so moving and 
elegant that another person could not help but mourn with him. He felt undaunted by this 
task however, Kochanowski sought to capture the pathos that his dire situation 
demanded, at least in his eyes.13
                                                 
12 Mersereau, Jr., “A Definition of the Emotion of Grief,” 37-38. 
 As he labored over Orszula’s literary monument, 
chiseling out the words that captured every subtlety, every shade, and every tear of his 
13 Pelc, Kochanowski, 525. 
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grief to full light, Kochanowski began at the beginning of his misfortune, when the force 
of Orszula’s death first came down on him.   
 
Wszytki płacze, wszyti łzy Herakitowe 
 I lamenty, i skargi Symonidowe, 
Wszytki troski na świecie, wszytki wzdychania 
 I żale, i frasunki, i rąk łamania, 
Wszytki a wszytki zaraz w dom sie mój nóscie 
 A mnie płakać mej wdzięcznej dziewki pomoście, 
Z którą mię niepobożna śmierć rozdzieliła 
 I wszytkich moich pociech nagle zbawiła. 
 
(All Heraclitean tears and woes, 
 All plaints and dirges of Simonides, 
All the world’s sorrows, griefs and cares, 
 All lamentations and wringing of hands, 
All but all enter my house at once 
 To help me mourn my precious girl 
Whom impious Death has gripped, 
 Suddenly ending all my joy.)14
 
 
Death had robbed Kochanowski of his “precious girl,” taking with her all of his 
comfort and happiness. Mourning, with all of its heavy baggage, had arrived to 
                                                 
14 Kochanowski, Treny, 4-5. 
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Kochanowski’s home without delay, cascading down “all but all” upon him. Profound 
grief was Death’s reward to fathers who had loved their children too much; Kochanowski 
had now found himself the unwilling recipient of this “gift.” He questioned the necessity 
of this “gift,” begging Death to remember that Orzsula had not deserved the bearing of its 
cost. 
 
O prawo krzywdy pełne! O Znikomych cieni 
Sroga, nieubłagana, nieużyta ksieni! 
Tak li moja Orszula, jeszcze żyć na śweiecie 
 Nie umiawszy, musiała w ranym umrzeć lecie? 
I nie napatrzawszy się jasności słonecznej, 
 Poszła nieboga widzieć krajów nocy wiecznej. 
A bodaj ani była świata oglądała, 
 Co Bowiem więcej, jedno ród a śmierć poznała. 
A miasto pociech, które winna z czasem była 
 Rodzicom swym, w ciezkim je smutku zostawila. 
 
(Oh merciless, cold and remorseless 
Sovereign of departing shades! 
 Orszula died innocent of life’s ways: 
The poor child briefly saw the light, 
 Now she journeys into endless night. 
Better if she’d never been! 
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 What had she but birth and death? 
Destroying the joy her shared 
 She left them anguish and despair.)15
 
  
Orszula, Kochanowski cried, had not deserved to die and to dwell in “endless 
night,” for she had been “innocent of life’s ways.” How could a child, he asked, who only 
“briefly saw the light” of the world, have suffered Death’s penalty? The echo of Death’s 
silence had sparked anger in Kochanowski, while rage added itself to the weight of his 
grief. If only Orszula had never existed, then her parents, above all her father, would not 
have to hold onto “anguish and despair” instead of her loving embrace. Regaining his 
composure, Kochanowski shamefully remembered that Orszula was not to blame for his 
sickness of grief. Perhaps, he thought, Death should have taken him instead: 
 
Alem ja już z jej śmierci nigdy żałościwszy, 
 Nigdy smutniejszy nie mógl być ani teskliwszy. 
A ona (by był Bóg chciał) dłuzszym wiekiem swoim 
 Siła pociech przymnożyć mogła oczom moim. 
A przynamniej tym czasem mogłem był odprawić 
 Wiek swój i Persefonie ostantniej sie stawic, 
Nie uczuwszy na sercu tak wielkiej żałości, 
 Której rownia nie widzę w tej tu śmiertelności. 
 
(But never could I have been 
                                                 
15 Kochanowski, Treny, 6-7. 
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More pained and grieving at her death. 
 Yet she, with God’s assent, 
Could in her fuller life 
 Have multiplied my joys.    
I could have run my course  
And gone to meet Proserpine 
Without that deepest grief 
 The like no mortal eyes have seen.)16
 
 
Regardless of how much he wished to take her place, Kochanowski knew that 
Orszula was gone forever. No selfless act of parental love for her could save him from 
“that deepest grief” that now stained every part of his life. However, despite of all of its 
“sorrows,” “wringing of hands,” and showers of “Heraclitean tears,” he could not induce 
himself to part so easily with this painful token of his loss. It was all that Orszula had 
bequeathed to her father. Not even those closest to him could convince him otherwise.                     
 
‘Prózno płaskać’—podobno drudzy rzeczecie. 
 Cóż, prze Bog żywy, nie jest prózno na śwecie? 
Wszystko prózno. Macamy, gdzie miękcej w rzeczy, 
 A ono wszędy ciśnie: błąd wiek człowieczy. 
Nie wiem, co lżej: czy w smutku jawnie żałować, 
 Czyli sie z przyrodzeniem gwałtem mocować. 
 
                                                 
16 Kochanowski, Treny, 10-11. 
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(‘You mourn in vain’—they say. But 
 Then what, by God, is not vain on earth? 
All is futile! We grope for relief 
 But pain pinches us on every side. 
Error rules our lives! 
 Is it better openly to grieve 
Or struggle fiercely against nature’s course?)17
 
 
 His state of uncontrollable grief was pointless, interjected Kochanowski’s 
anonymous “they.”  However, the simplicity of their answer did not satisfy him again his 
previous anger and rage returned. Why was his grief and mourning, Kochanowski 
answered, completely “in vain”? Were not all earthly things “vain” and “futile,” he 
pressed on, if humanity could not grieve for ones it had most cherished? Such advice 
itself was “futile,” for it forgot that the “pain” pinching him now in his times of sorrow 
also was one which could pinch all of humanity. In Kochanowski’s eyes, grief was an 
“error” that controlled the lives of all men, and his own reaction provided convincing 
evidence enough. It was in humanity’s nature to grieve, in spite of the advice that the 
anonymous “they” proposed.18
                                                 
17 Kochanowski, Treny, 4-5. 
 In this rejection, Kochanowski presented the central 
tension of his crisis: how and with what could one alleviate grief if it is natural to 
humanity? The rest of Treny records the struggle that Kochanowski faced as he searched 
for the answer to this question. There, however, is far more to Kochanowski’s story of 
grief in Treny than just grief over a child. 
18 Pelc, Kochanowski, 526-527. 
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In this thesis, I use Treny, a masterpiece in Polish literature, as a clue, a trace from 
which to reconsider our understanding of the Renaissance. Until fairly recently, scholars 
have tended to view the Renaissance as a primarily Italian or, more generally, a western 
European phenomenon. For most, the idea of the Renaissance in eastern Europe is simply 
absurd. Modern political developments of the twentieth century in eastern Europe have 
certainly contributed to this opinion. A few, more-perceptive historians “know that in its 
diffusion throughout Europe the Renaissance did not halt at arbitrary boundary dividing 
Europe into western and eastern halves.”19
First, the sentiments that resonate through Treny are clearly tied to a cosmopolitan 
language. Kochanowski had traveled, as we shall see, extensively in western Europe, 
especially in Italy where he pursued his humanist interests at one of the most important 
universities at the time. In joining the ranks of the humanists, he shared their reverence 
for the study and proper imitation of the languages and literatures of Greco-Roman 
antiquity. Similarly, he knew and interacted with many of the same movements of 
philosophical and religious ideas that flourished throughout Renaissance Europe. In this 
sense, Renaissance humanism had offered a rich cosmopolitan European culture to 
persons from different countries, connecting them in a common outlook and approach to 
 Except for a few highly specialized studies, 
eastern Europe does not really exist in discussions of the Renaissance. But, as I shall 
argue, the Treny of Jan Kochanowski offers compelling evidence that this view is 
mistaken. 
                                                 
19 Harold B. Segel, Renaissance Culture in Poland: The Rise of Humanism, 1470-1543 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), 1. 
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living.20
Yet it is not an easy matter to reconstruct Kochanowski’s life. Simply put, 
Kochanowski’s life is a mystery.  We have few accounts of his youth, his education, his 
personal thoughts, his political life, his marriage, or his family life. What remains is his 
poetry, along with a few other scattered clues.
 By focusing on and contextualizing his reaction to grief, his search for 
consolation in humanism, and his subsequent rejection of his own humanism in Treny, 
we will see that Jan Kochanowski is an outstanding representative of this cosmopolitan 
European culture in Poland.  
21 My task in this thesis, therefore, involves 
the effort to use poetry as a historical source; and my strategy is largely contextual. My 
method, that is, is to develop contexts that help explain the sorts of sentiments and ideas 
that Kochanowski expressed in the Treny. Consequently, my work is speculative. But it is 
not blind speculation. Instead it is based on what the early modernist Natalie Zemon 
Davis has called a reconstruction of “the realm of the probable.”22
    
 In this effort, 
therefore, I use every clue I can find to make connections that enable a reconstruction of 
the significance of Kochanowski’s story of grief. In the end, this story of a humanist’s 
response to grief will not be one just isolated to the confines of Poland, but will find its 
place in Renaissance Europe.                
                                                 
20 Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist 
Strains (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 22-23. 
21 Pelc, Kochanowski, 63-65. 
22 For an excellent treatment of the historian’s approach to “the realm of the probable”, see Natalie Zemon 
Davis, “AHR Forum: The Return of Martin Guerre ‘On the Lame’,” in The American Historical Review 93, 
no. 3 (Jun., 1988): 572. 
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One: Vergil and Homer in Poland—the Making of a Humanist 
 
At the time of Orszula’s death, Kochanowski had retired to the leisurely life of a 
country noble at his bucolic estate of Czarnolas, following a long and successful career as 
a courtier, poet, and humanist. Born in 1530 in the town of Sycyna, located in the region 
of Radom, just south of Warsaw, Jan had come from a well-to-do noble family. The 
distant rural setting of the Kochanowski ancestral home in Radom did not prevent the 
family from engaging in fashionable educational and cultural pursuits of the day.1 
Contacts with the vibrant renewal of classical culture, especially humanism, in Italy since 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, fueled a strong infatuation among the noble 
families of Poland and Lithuania, who spared no expense in imitating and incorporating 
“all things ancients” into every aspect of their lives.2 Instead of castles, they build palaces 
and villas in accordance with latest Renaissance architectural innovations, hiring Italian 
architects to supervise such projects. In less than a century, the royal capital of Krakow 
was transformed from a medieval town into a flourishing Renaissance city.3
                                                 
1 Pelc, Kochanowski, 23. 
 They 
incorporated classical learning into their cultural lives by sending their sons to study at 
Italian universities. Returning to Poland, these young nobles brought back with them “a 
2 Tadeusz Ulewicz, “Polish Humanism and Its Italian Sources: Beginnings and Historical Development,” in 
The Polish Renaissance in its European Context, ed. Samuel Fitzman (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1988), 215-219. The Polish contacts with Italian influences occurred in three way during this time 
period: Poles traveling to Italy; the arrival and residence of Italian scholars in Poland, who were stationed 
usually for diplomatic and political purposes; and the diffusion of Italian cultural concerns from Germany 
and Hungary. For further treatment, see source cites above.   
3 Adam Milobedzki, “Architecture under the Last Jagiellons in its Political and Social Contexts,” in The 
Polish Renaissance in its European Context, ed. Samuel Fitzman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1988), 291-293. 
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taste for” cosmopolitan humanist culture, one which they did not hesitate to share with 
their peers.4
 
  
Fig. 2. Statue at Kochanowski’s Tomb in Zwolen, Poland 
 
Source: Janusz Pelc, Kochanowski: Szczyt renesansu w literaturze polskiej 
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), 588. 
 
Humanism was no stranger to the Kochanowski home. A fondness for Greek and 
Roman literature permeated the household throughout Jan’s youth. His mother, Anna, a 
“stately” woman of considerable learning and “wit,” took it upon herself to acquaint Jan 
                                                 
4 Paul W. Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era: Humanism and the Academic Culture of 
the Early Renaissance in Poland,” in The Polish Renaissance in its European Context, ed. Samuel Fitzman 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 190. 
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and his brothers with the classics of antiquity from an early age.5 Far from the shores of 
the Mediterranean and Aegean, the gods and heroes of Homer and Vergil had found a 
new home in the life of this “rustic” Polish family. Two of Jan’s brothers, Mikołaj and 
Andrzej, went on to study in Italy and became noted humanists themselves, achieving 
significant literary success by translating respectively the works of Plutarch and Vergil’s 
Aeneid into Polish.6
Kochanowski began his studies at the age of fourteen when in 1544 he entered the 
University of Krakow.
 Not surprisingly then, Jan would soon follow his siblings’ 
humanistic tendencies.           
7 He remained there until about 1549 at a university that was the 
chief center of humanist activity in Poland and Lithuania.8 Indeed, the thriving 
intellectual life of the university would have allowed a youthful Jan to immerse himself 
in the wide variety of humanistic studies.9 Kochanowski “entered a university whose 
scholastic character had, in the course of the generations before him, been transformed by 
the pedagogical program and literary tastes of the traditions of Renaissance humanism.”10
                                                 
5 Łukasz Górnicki, a prominent Polish humanist and friend of Jan Kochanowski, referred to the charm and 
wit of Anna Kochanowska in his Dworzanin polski (The Polish Courtier, 1566), a work based on 
Castiglione’s The Courtier. See Pelc, Kochanowski, 23-24.  
 
Again, Poland’s contacts with the Italian peninsula had made such a revolutionary 
makeover of the university possible. Furthermore, two eminent humanists, Conrad Celtis 
and Filippo Buonaccorsi (better known as Callimachus), helped cement the place of 
humanistic studies in the university’s curriculum by attracting masses of students and 
6 David Welch, Jan Kochanowski (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1974), 14. 
7 The lack of any records or information on Kochanowski’s humanist education is a subject that has both 
troubled and fascinated scholars. The recorded date of Kochanowski’s matriculation at Krakow in 1544 
among the university archives is one of the few gems of knowledge we have on his education. See Henryk 
Barycz, “Studia krakowskie Jana Kochanowskiego,” in Z Zaścianka na Parnas: drogi kulturalnego 
rozwoju Jana Kochanowskiego i jego rodu (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1981), 64.   
8 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 15-16. 
9 Tadeusz Ulewicz, “Polish Humanism and Its Italian Sources,” 220. 
10 Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era,” 189. 
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other humanists to Krakow with lectures at the end of the fifteenth century.11 A close 
friend of Ficino, and later an important political figure in the Polish royal court, 
Callimachus provided Krakow with a direct connection to the ideas and texts of 
Florentine Platonism, whose influence lingered among several humanist circles of the 
university all the way into Kochanowski’s time.12
As early as 1430, many Polish humanists at the university preferred the 
intellectual environment of Padua and its Aristotelianism, choosing to study there before 
returning Krakow to teach. The university orator from 1440 to 1447, Jan of Ludzisko, 
also a member of the medical faculty and a graduate of Padua (1421-1430), met and 
corresponded with its first humanist professor, Gasparino Barzizza, during his stay 
there.
  
13 In a similar fashion, the works of several of Krakow’s graduates would prove 
revolutionary and contributed greatly to the larger philosophical discussions and 
scientific discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. No better examples of 
which exists than the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium of Nicolaus Copernicus, also 
a Krakow graduate, which was published posthumously in 1543, only a year before 
Kochanowski’s own arrival to this stimulating environment.14
Steadily arriving from such centers of classical learning as Florence and Padua 
since the middle of the fifteenth century, new humanist editions of ancient texts by 
Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Quintillian, Suetonius, Vergil and Ovid, along with the bold 
literary and philosophical works of such renowned humanists as Petrarch, Boccaccio, 
      
                                                 
11 Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era,” 202-203. 
12 Segel, Renaissance Culture in Poland, 22-23 
13 Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era,” 193-194. 
14 Edward Rosen, “What Copernicus Owed to the West and What We Owe to Copernicus,” in The Polish 
Renaissance in its European Context, Ed. Samuel Fitzman, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 
162-163. 
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Ficino, and Pico della Mirandola, would have found themselves into Jan’s hands in the 
Collegium minus, the headquarters of the university’s humanists since 1449.15 Founded 
for the explicit purpose of promoting the “heightened literary and humanistic tradition of 
the university,” the Collegium Minus was the place where students of the university could 
go to indulge themselves in “the new learning from Italy.”16 Undoubtedly drawn to the 
studies that it offered, it was within the walls of the Collegium that Kochanowski fell 
under the tutelage of its most eminent humanist, Jan of Trzciany.17
Also known as Arundinensis, Jan of Trzciany became the central figure in the 
humanist movement during his short tenure at the university. He had been a student at the 
university between 1525 and 1535. Though Trzciany may not have continued his studies 
in Italy, he proved himself a remarkable scholar and a fair philosopher, who knew and 
taught the most significant and latest works of the Italian humanists
  
18 Advertising his 
epithet of “vir trilinguis” quite proudly throughout the university, Trzciany possessed a 
remarkable knowledge of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew.19 Well versed in classical literature, 
he lectured practically on every author of antiquity, from Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and 
Seneca to Homer, Vergil, and Horace, as well as on Augustine and other early Church 
Fathers.20
                                                 
15 Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era,” 196. 
 With his frequent discussions of neo-Latin humanist works, such as Valla’s De 
elegantia linguae latinae and Erasmus’ Adagia, he also drew throngs of students and 
16 Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era,” 200. 
17 Pelc, Kochanowski, 30. 
18 Henryk Barycz, Historja Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego w epoce humanizmu (Krakow: Nakladem 
Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 1935), 359-360. Scholars have neglected the importance of Trzciany to the 
University of Krakow, as well as the subject of his possible Italian influences. Further research could yield 
a better insight of his significance to the Polish humanist movement.  
19 Barycz, Historia Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 360. 
20 Pelc, Kochanowski, 30. 
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professors, young Jan among them.21 A consummate polymath, Trzciany provided 
Kochanowski with many of the essentials of the studia humanitatis, such as grammar, 
rhetoric, poetry, and the ars dictamini (the art of letter writing), as well as moral 
philosophy.22
In 1544, Trzciany delivered a series of lectures entitled “lectura de anima”, which 
concentrated on various philosophical interpretations of humanity’s dignity and soul, 
later forming the basis of his most significant work, Libellus de natura ac dignitate 
hominis, published in 1554.
 The study of philosophy, above all else, appeared to excite Trzciany’s 
interests and discussions, especially the topic of the dignity of humanity.  
23 Demonstrating a familiarity of various philosophical 
traditions, classical and eastern in origin, as well as a syncretic understanding of them, 
Trzciany’s discussions and conclusions on humanity’s dignity owed much to the works of 
his beloved idol, the renowned humanist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in particular his 
Oration on the Dignity of Man.24 In celebrating humanity’s ability to transcend any 
earthly difficulties and achieve perfection, Trzciany’s work and lectures highlighted not 
only Pico’s influential sentiments on this perennially favorite humanist topic, but also 
ones found throughout many of the works of such humanists as Manetti and Petrarch.25 
Not surprisingly, Trzciany’s own reflections in sixteenth century Krakow on the dignity 
of man affirmed a longstanding and important concern that echoed through the larger 
humanist movement.26
                                                 
21 Henryk Barycz, “Studia krakowskie Jana Kochanowskiego,” 64-67. 
 The subject of his lectures might have caught the attention of a 
young Kochanowski freshly arrived to Krakow, spurring him to seek out Trzciany. 
22 Barycz, “Studia krakowskie,” 67. Also Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 171. 
23 Pelc, Kochanowski, 30. 
24 Barycz, Historia Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 360. For Pico’s Oration, see Ernst Cassirer et al., The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 223-54. 
25 Pelc, Kochanowski, 30.  
26 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and its Sources, 171. 
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Perhaps, it was the idea that humanity alone could rise above all difficulties of the world 
to reach divine perfection that remained in the young Pole’s mind as he pursued his 
humanistic interests, finding justification in the works of the ancients and the modern 
humanists. Though acquiring a wide familiarity with the languages, literatures, and 
thought of antiquity with Trzciany, 
The University of Krakow began to suffer a considerable decline in academic 
rigor in 1547 with the departure of many of its humanist proponents, including Trzciany, 
for other schools in eastern Europe.
 Kochanowski would not finish his incipient humanist 
education in Krakow. 
27 The culprit for this exodus was the resurgence of 
the Scholastics, who took over many of the key professorships and position in the 
administration of the university. Additionally, a drastic reduction of funding from the 
Polish Crown during this time certainly helped speed its decay too.28 In time, the 
university simply could not compete with Italian universities such as Bologna and Padua, 
whose liberating intellectual atmosphere continued to attract new minds and cultivate 
bold ideas.29
Though leaving Krakow in 1549, Kochanowski did not set out for Italy 
immediately. Instead, he headed first to Königsberg, in northern Ducal Prussia, for a 
recently established academy dedicated to humanistic studies, as well as to the spread of 
 Krakow could not offer what Jan desired, but these schools in Italy, the 
birthplace of humanism, undoubtedly did. Kochanowski knew that if he wished to receive 
a truly excellent humanist education, the ancient ruins and sunny Mediterranean climate 
of the Italian universities could provide him with that.  
                                                 
27 Barycz, Historia Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 361. Also Pelc, Kochanowski, 30. 
28 Knoll, “The University Context of Kochanowski’s Era,” 205.  
29 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 29. 
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Lutheranism into Poland and Lithuania.30 Why would Kochanowski have chose to go to 
the new school in the north instead of the established and prestigious universities of Italy? 
Was it because Kochanowski was a Protestant? Though raised in a Catholic family, 
Kochanowski might have developed Protestant sympathies while studying at Krakow, 
which had also became a center for the Reformation in Poland in his time.31 Many of 
Kochanowski’s friends, such as Stanislaw Grzepski and Andrzej Firlej, sons of noble 
families, dedicated themselves to furthering the reformed cause while in Königsberg. 32 
In fact, a large part of the nobility in Poland and Lithuania had converted to Protestantism 
during Reformation, whether for political, religious, or personal reasons. Yet, 
Kochanowski never explicitly stated his religious views, only dropping subtle and 
extremely vague hints on matters of faith in his poetic works.33 Perhaps Kochanowski 
might have considered Königsberg a potentially more congenial and profitable place to 
study—a place that provided him with an opportunity to explore his Protestant 
sympathies.34 During his brief stay, he befriended the academy’s director, Georgius 
Sabinus, a German humanist and reformer, who was also the son-in-law of one of the 
most eminent humanist leaders of the Reformation, Philip Melanchthon.35
                                                 
30 George Hunston Williams, The Radical Reformation (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1962), 404-
407. 
 More 
importantly, he found a munificent benefactor in the person of Albrecht Hohenzollern, 
the duke of Prussia and the academy’s founder, who strongly supported his humanist 
aspirations and subsequently supplied him with generous funds to “hither forth to 
31 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 26 
32 Pelc, Kochanowski, 32. 
33 Wiktor Weintraub, “Religia Kochanowskiego a polska kultura renesansowa,” in Rzecz Czarnolas, 
(Krakow: Wydawn. Literackie, 1977), 237-238. 
34 Stanisław Kot, “Jana Kochanowskiego podróże i studia zagranicezne.” Polska zlotego wieku a Europa: 
Studia i szkice (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1987), 218-219. 
35 Kot, “Jana Kochanowskiego podróże,” 218-220. 
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Italy.”36 The young Pole’s humanist interest and religious sympathies must have also 
appealed to Albrecht’s ambition in creating a group of highly educated and reform-
minded Polish nobles loyal to him in Poland and Lithuania.37 Not surprisingly when 
Albrecht died later in 1568, Kochanowski dedicated a major work, his Proporzec, albo 
Hołd pruski (The Banner, or the Prussian Homage), to him, praising the former duke’s 
virtues but above all, his generosity.38
 
 Armed with the duke’s blessing and funds, 
Kochanowski departed from Königsberg in the latter part of 1550, with his eyes set for 
Italy. 
In April of 1551, Jan reached the chosen destination of his Italian journey, the 
University of Padua.39 For young Polish noblemen like Kochanowski, eager to immerse 
themselves in the exciting new ideas in science, philosophy, and literature permeating 
throughout the Italian Peninsula, Padua was an ideal choice. The gem of the Venetian 
Republic, the University of Padua had become a school of high repute throughout Europe 
in the sixteenth century for its “scholarly accomplishments and pedagogical innovations” 
in medicine, law, and philosophy.40 Many of the foremost scholars in these fields, such as 
Pietro Pomponazzi and Andreas Vesalius, also taught at Padua. Consequently, the 
university’s impeccable credentials provided many of its former students with many 
honors and lucrative political positions in their native lands “simply because they [had] 
been to Padua.”41
                                                 
36 Pelc, Kochanowski, 35-36. Translation mine. 
 A well-trained humanist was a valuable commodity in the princely and 
37 Pelc, Kochanowski, 34-35. 
38 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 40-41. 
39 Kot, “Jana Kochanowskiego podróże,” 224-225. 
40 Paul F. Grendler, “The University of Padua 1405-1600: A Success Story,” in Books and Schools in the 
Italian Renaissance (Brookfield: Variorium, 1995), 12. 
41 Grendler, “The University of Padua,” 13-14. 
  
20 
ecclesiastical courts of Poland and Lithuania and, as his later success as a courtier proved, 
Jan was no exception to this Paduan boon.42 Studying with two humanists of the highest 
caliber, Francesco Robortello and Bernardino Tomitano, Jan acquired a thorough 
knowledge of Greek and Latin authors. These two humanists’ interests in poetry, almost 
certainly helped spur and shape Kochanowski’s poetic ambitions, providing the young 
Pole with the literary tools and knowledge to experiment in both Latin and Polish verse.43
Additionally, it was here that Kochanowski came to cherish Cicero above all 
other writers of antiquity. Like many humanists, Kochanowski admired Cicero’s own 
combination of literary eloquence and wisdom in his works, a quality that would echo 
later on throughout Kochanowski’s own writing.
  
44 Similarly, if in the likely event he 
visited other Italian cities such as Florence, he could have been exposed to other 
philosophical as well as humanist topics and discussions. Since he was not studying for a 
degree, Kochanowski was free to explore any of the vast number of subjects offered in 
Padua, and could have joined in any of the numerous philosophical discussions, ranging 
from man’s dignity to the immortality of his soul, that dominated the university.45 In a 
sense, Kochanowski’s education in Padua brought him not only into contact with many 
aspects of what could be considered “mainstream European culture” but also specifically 
into the shared cultural and educational context of the humanists everywhere.46
                                                 
42 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 29. 
 When he 
left Padua in 1557, Kochanowski would carry these humanist ideals with him to Poland, 
making full use of them in his endeavors as poet and courtier.         
43 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 30. 
44 Wiktor Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” in The Slavonic and East European Review 
30, no. 75 (1951): 417. 
45 Pelc, Kochanowski, 43-46; also see Paul Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 403-407. 
46 Kot, “Jana Kochanowskiego podróże,” 227-229. 
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Traveling through France and Germany after his departure from Italy, 
Kochanowski embarked upon a career as a courtier when he returned to Poland in 1559, 
moving among the courts of many prominent nobles and clergymen and eventually rising 
to the position of royal secretary to the Polish king, Zygmunt II August. During his spell 
as a courtier, Kochanowski became friends with many of the most powerful and 
important persons in the Commonwealth, such as Jan Tarnowski, hetman of Lithuania, 
Mikołaj Firlej, palatine of Małopolska and Lithuania, as well as Piotr Myszkowski, 
bishop of Krakow and vice-chancellor to Zygmunt II August, and Jan Zamoyski, the 
future chancellor of the Commonwealth, both of whom were graduates of Padua.47
 Freed largely from financial burdens, Kochanowski gained considerable 
admiration from patrons and peers alike throughout Poland and Lithuania for his Latin 
and Polish poetry during his court years. Echoing his infatuation with Greek and Roman 
antiquity, Kochanowski transformed the Polish language with his use of classical literary 
modes in his poetry, placing it on par with the poetic achievements of France and Italy. 
Kochanowski’s success as a poetic innovator in this respect stemmed from  
 From 
these distinguished individuals, he received generous patronage, in the form of church 
benefices and favorable court appointments, which allowed him to concentrate on 
establishing his reputation as a poet.    
 
his replacing of the so-called relative syllabism of medieval poetry with a 
strictly codified and rigorously implemented system of regular syllabic 
meters; its increased discipline actually [allowed] him to gain more 
                                                 
47 Pelc, Kochanowski, 60-63. N.B. a hetman was the supreme military commander of a region or province 
in either Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
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creative freedom in other area of style, just as the bridle improves a 
horse’s maneuver-ability without necessarily affecting its speed.48
 
  
 
Kochanowski’s impact on the development of Polish poetry was so great that Mikołaj 
Rej, the leading writer of Polish verse before Kochanowski, upon reading Kochanowski’s 
first published Polish poem, “Czego chcesz od nas Panie, za Twe hojne dary” (“What do 
you wish O Lord in return for your bounteous gifts”) remarked: “I acknowledge his 
superiority in learning and place in his keeping the muse of the Slavonic Goddess.”49 
Besides foreshadowing his future poetic achievements as a Polish writer, this poem 
revealed much about what Kochanowski had learned during his humanist education. 
Overflowing with jubilant praise for God’s benevolence and majesty, Kochanowski’s 
poem proclaimed his deepest optimism in the goodness and perfection of humanity. This 
theme would dominate his early works, such as Satyr, albo Dziki Mąż (Satyr, or the Wild 
Man) and Muza (Muse), despite the numerous political upheavals that he witnessed in 
Poland and Lithuania during his career as a courtier.50
Tired of the demands and intrigues of court life, as well as disappointed in not 
receiving more lucrative and prestigious posts at the Court of Zygmund II, Kochanowski 
retired to the otium of a country gentleman. With his finances secured by his inheritance, 
he dedicated himself entirely to family and poetry in the bucolic setting of his country 
estate of Czarnolas. A considerable country estate, tranquil domestic life, and the life of a 
stoic poet, in imitation of his idols Horace and Cicero, seemed to promise Kochanowski a 
       
                                                 
48  Stanislaw Baranczak, “Introduction,” in Jan Kochanowski, Laments, trans. Stanislaw Baranczak and 
Seamus Heaney (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), x-xi. 
49 Reported by J.S. Herburt in 1612, as quoted in Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 
413. 
50 Welch, Jan Kochanowski, 33. 
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life of happiness and bliss to the end of his days. This environment provided 
Kochanowski with what he had sought for both personally and artistically. His family 
grew with the births of two daughters, Hanna and Orzsula. He also composed and edited 
several collections of his best-known poetry, which included Fraszki, Pieśni, and Psałterz 
Davidów, all resonating the faith in humanity that he had articulated in “Czego chcesz od 
nas Panie, za Twe hojne dary” almost twenty years earlier. But his idyllic life was 
shattered with the devastating and tragic loss of his daughter Orszula. The horrendous 
grief still tormented him, sending him on an arduous odyssey of deep personal 
introspection, one filled with despair, self-doubt, pain, and regret. In search of 
consolation, Kochanowski looked once more to humanism to lead him from the confines 
of grief. 
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Two: The Malady of Grief in Renaissance Humanism 
 
Kochanowski could not shake the sadness and sorrow of his misfortune from the 
depths of his thoughts. Grief still loomed over him in Treny. Though continually startled 
from relief by their echo, he found himself uttering Orszula’s last words yet again. 
 
‘Już ja tobie, moja matko, słuzyć nie będę 
 Ani za twym wdzięcznym stołem miejsca zasiędę; 
Przyjdzie mi klucze połozyć, samej precz jechać,     
Domu rodziców swych miłych wiecznie zaniechać’. 
To, i czego żal ojcowski nie da serdeczny 
 Przypominać więcej, był jej głos ostateczny. 
A matce, słysząc żegnanie tak żałościwe, 
 Dobre serce, że od żalu zostało żywe. 
 
(‘I shall no longer serve you, mother dear, 
 I shall not linger at laden board, 
I lay down my keys, I must abroad, 
 And lose for ever my dear parents’ care.’ 
These, together with what fatherly grief 
 Finds too painful to recall, 
Were her last words. And it is well 
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 Her mother has outlived this pained farewell.)1
 
 
The mourning over Orszula had passed from his household, Kochanowski 
noticed. His wife Dorota, the last person to hold Orszula at her deathbed, had “outlived 
this pained farewell” of her daughter and accepted her death. Only Jan continued to 
persist in his “fatherly grief,” exceeding even the sorrow expected of a mother.2 Where 
could Kochanowski look to explain and perhaps relieve his “uncommon” grief? What 
could console the sorrow he recorded in Treny? His humanist principles, he thought, 
presented Kochanowski with the precise framework within which he could use in his 
search for consolation in Treny.3
Grief and consolation were concerns that “commanded a prominent place in 
humanist moral thought and literature.”
 Perhaps, he thought, his humanism could offer him the 
solace and repose that a bereaved father deserved.                 
4 However unpleasant they were, the humanists’ 
preoccupations with these topics were not unfounded. Instead, they reflected a 
“heightened awareness of death” that permeated the lives and actions of “men and 
women” in the Renaissance.5  With Treny, Kochanowski looked to this long tradition of 
humanist interest in the perpetual problems of death, grief, despair, and misfortune to 
understand his experience with his daughter’s death.6
                                                 
1 Kochanowski, Treny, 14-15.  
 A bereaved parent plagued with 
these difficulties, he would have found that he was not the only grieving father to have 
commiserated over the death of a child. Rather, the image of the grieving father had its 
2 King, The Death of the Child, 149. 
3 Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s Lament,” 38-39. 
4 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 3. 
5 King, The Death of the Child, 195-196. 
6 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 3. 
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origins in the ancient world with the works of Crantor, Cicero, and Plutarch.7  Whether 
grieving or not, humanists such as Petrarch, Barzizza, Salutati, and Manetti would 
continue this tradition into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, expressing their sorrows 
in a variety of literary genres drawn from their predecessors in antiquity.8 Perhaps more 
important, by looking to the wisdom of the ancient world as a guide, these humanists 
would also shape the approaches and perceptions of grief in the consolatory works of 
later writers, especially Kochanowski.9
Kochanowski knew the “expectations” that accompanied a humanist attempting a 
work of consolation.
           
10  The author had to praise the deceased’s past, character, deeds, 
virtues, and, family.11 The work must also have a series of arguments and justifications to 
the bereaved “for the cessation of grief (the need for moderation, the dangers and pains of 
living, the understanding of death as a change for the better and as an occasion of joy).”12 
These “expectations” were not meant to limit and confine the emotional expression of 
grief of the author or the work. Instead, “[by] rejecting dialectic and theoretical learning 
[of the scholastics], humanist writers… cultivated a practical eloquence that spoke to the 
human emotion, the human will, the human psyche…[and by] fully acknowledging the 
humanity of sorrow, they sought out comforts from neglected troves of Platonic, Stoic, 
Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Christian thought.”13
                                                 
7 King, The Death of the Child, 192. 
 In addition, a work of consolation had to 
capture the full emotional essence of the bereaved’s grief to convince them to ease them 
away from its tight grip. This had been Kochanowski’s intention in Treny. Yet, the 
8 King, The Death of the Child, 194-195. 
9 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation,  4. 
10 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissnace Manifesto,” 423. 
11 King, The Death of the Child, 185. 
12 King, The Death of the Child, 185. 
13 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 4. 
  
27 
interplay between his expression of grief and his reliance on humanist attitudes towards 
grief unsettled Kochanowski, presenting him with a troubling paradox. How could he 
express and legitimize the inconsolable grief, yet also adhere to the demands that 
humanist conventions dictated the need for the ultimate cessation of grief? The collision 
between the needs of the grieving father and the expectations of the humanist in Treny 
would only complicated the solution to this problem even further for him. How could he 
console the inconsolable? 
For the humanists, the solution lay in the dignity of humanity. This idea, which 
Kochanowski held so dear, “was inherent in the cultural and educational program of the 
Renaissance humanists”: 
 
When the Renaissance humanists called their studies the ‘humanities’ or Studia 
humanitatis, they expressed the claim that these studies contribute to the 
education of a desirable human being, and hence are of vital concern for man as 
man. Thus they indicated a basic concern for man and his dignity, and this 
aspiration became quite explicit in many of their writings.14
 
   
It was this confidence in humanity’s dignity and abilities which expected and necessitated 
the cessation of grief on the part of author or addressee in a humanist consolation, or 
consolatio.15
                                                 
14 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 124-125. 
 Drawing upon the philosophical writings and traditions of antiquity, 
humanist writers and Renaissance philosophers encouraged a person’s exploration of the 
nature and cause of grief for the benefit of the mind and soul. In drawing the rationality 
15 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 6-7. 
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of these philosophies to the arguments concerning the continuation of grief, the bereaved 
would realize his or her irrational distress over the ‘bodily’ aspects of the world and 
reject them. In agreement with the conventions set forth for a humanist consolatio, the 
bereaved’s moving away from grief would echo this important cathartic moment.16
Yet, these humanist interpretations of grief therapy emphasized the importance of 
humanity and ability to overcome its misfortune, they differed in how they substantiated 
and explained its release. To the Platonists, such as Ficino and Pico, “the immortality of 
the soul and its separation from the body served as the principal locus for otherworldly 
idealism.”
 In 
doing this, the bereaved person would rise to the higher, more spiritual level that 
philosophy sought and demanded of humanity.  
17 For such advocates, the soul has an innate desire to return to God and remain 
aloof from the complications of fortune to which the body is subject. Hence, as Ficino 
underlined, “the bereaved need but open their spiritual eyes and ears to regain the 
company of the departed.”18
The Stoics, by contrast, offered a more severe explanation for the termination of 
grief. They stressed the importance of “virtual impassivity,” that is freedom from all 
pathe towards tragedy, as the most appropriate reaction to death.
  
19
                                                 
16 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 6-7. 
 Basing the goods and 
evils of the world on humanity’s exercise of virtue and vice respectively, they called for 
its indifference to any emotional preoccupations that the misfortunes and externalities of 
the world had spurred. Though related to the Stoics in their emphasis on virtue being the 
ultimate good, the Peripatetics or Aristotelians delineated a quite different view on the 
17 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 5. Also King, The Death of the Child, 176-177. 
18 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 147. 
19 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 5. 
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subject of grief. For the Peripatetics, the misfortunes of death and grief had “an 
inexorable and legitimate impact on man’s equanimity.”20
Despite their differences, each of these philosophical traditions emphasized the 
eventual need for the bereaved to move beyond the emotion of grief. Drawing from such 
classical philosophical bases, the humanists centered their approach to grief, as well as its 
alleviation, in the elevated status that these traditions had accorded to humanity. For most 
part, the humanists did not focus solely on one philosophical perspective solely in a work 
of consolation. Instead, they would incorporate frequently various parts from these 
philosophies within the consolatio, choosing points that were most suitable to the 
argument, even if they held a penchant for a particular tradition.
 Consequently, the exploration 
and cessation of grief was a valid concern of mankind, for it led him or her back to the 
virtuous pursuit of human happiness.  
21
Cicero’s impact on the humanist movement as a whole was decisive: 
“Renaissance humanism was an age of Ciceronianism in which the study and imitation of 
Cicero was a widespread concern.”
 A humanist consolatio 
could be an eloquent hodgepodge of eclectic philosophical perspectives, though not 
always free from contradictions, as Kochanowski began to learn. Yet, the humanists still 
looked to one figure from the ancient world as a model that could overcome these 
contradictions, Cicero.                  
22
                                                 
20 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 5. 
 The force of Cicero’s influence resonated strongly 
throughout the varied interests of the humanists, as well as their works, because of the 
valuable knowledge that his works provided of the ancient world. For instance, his 
writings “served as [sources] of information for several schools of Greek philosophy and 
21 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 9. 
22 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 18.  
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also as a model of that eclectic type of thinking which was prepared to take its crumbs of 
knowledge wherever it could find them, and which also characterizes many of the 
humanist treatises.”23 Lastly, his “synthesis of philosophy and rhetoric in his works 
provided the humanists with a favorite ideal, namely the combination of eloquence and 
wisdom,” which they themselves sought eagerly to emulate in their own works.24  The 
ubiquity of the humanists’ “worship” of Cicero was not without its critics however, such 
as Montaigne. Regardless, his philosophical impact (and to a lesser degree that of his 
successor Seneca) made later the humanists’ understanding of grief and death (and 
consequently the consolatio), was tremendous. 25
How did Cicero influence the humanists’ approach to grief? Two of Cicero’s 
works in particular, his lost Consolatio and his Disputationes Tusculanae, proved to be 
the cornerstones of their understanding of grief. These works, especially his Consolatio, 
came to exert such influence on the humanists that “various writers from the fourteenth 
and sixteenth centuries cited, imitated, or, in one case, even forged his treatise.”
  
26 In 
these works, Cicero drew extensively upon the consolatory writings of the Greek 
philosopher Crantor, whose lost works only appeared in fragments, and examined the 
wide range of philosophical opinion concerning grief from antiquity. Much like 
Kochanowski’s purpose in Treny, Cicero’s Consolatio was an attempt to alleviate the 
sorrow he experienced with the death of his beloved daughter, Tullia.27
                                                 
23 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 19. 
 Despite the 
unfortunate loss of his Consolatio, Cicero luckily makes several references to the work in 
his Disputationes Tusculanae, a synthesis of Greek philosophy. In Book III of 
24 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 19. 
25 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 6. 
26 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 6. 
27 McClure, Sorrrow and Consolation, 6. 
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Disputationes Tusculanae, Cicero concisely conveyed the precise intended purpose of a 
consoler, tying it in to his own examination of grief:  
 
These therefore are the duties of comforters: to do away with distress root and 
branch, or allay it, or diminish it as far as possible, or stop its progress and not 
allow it to extend further, or to divert it elsewhere…There are some too in favour 
of concentrating all the these ways of administering comfort (for one man is 
influenced in one way, one in another) pretty nearly as in my Consolation I threw 
them all into one attempt at consolation; for my soul was in a feverish state and I 
attempted every means of curing its condition.28
 
                 
In discussing his own approach to grief and consolation, Cicero consequently laid 
out the key philosophical principles that would eventually pervade throughout the 
consolations of the humanists, including Kochanowski’s Treny. Rather than dictating a 
specific format or genre of the consolation, Cicero’s thoughts on this topic instead shaped 
the philosophical framework of the consolatio, whether the piece was a letter, a treatise, 
an elegy, or an oration.29
This influence found its way most prominently into the second aspect of the 
humanist consolatio, which called for a discourse on various viewpoints and arguments 
for the elimination of grief. The humanists frequently used Cicero’s own discussions of 
various viewpoints and arguments on the nature of grief in Disputationes Tusculanae (as 
well as his Consolatio indirectly) frequently as a philosophical “sourcebook” for their 
  
                                                 
28 Cicero Tusculan Disputations, 3.31.76. 
29 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 7-9. 
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works, emphasizing Cicero’s belief that philosophy was a healer of the soul and a 
liberator of anxiety, desire, and fear.30 Outstanding humanists such as Francesco Filelfo 
and Gasparino Barizza, emphasized Cicero’s advice that the divine attributes of man such 
as “activity”, “wisdom”, “discovery”, and “memory” were essential in controlling grief 
and in further pursuing a virtuous life. Perhaps most significantly however, many 
humanists emphasized Cicero’s criterion that the immortality of humanity’s soul made 
excessive grief futile.31
 
 In quoting an extensive part of his own Consolatio, Cicero set 
forth his view on the relationship of man’s soul to the misfortune of grief, calling 
attention to its divine origin.  
No beginning of souls can be discovered on earth; for there is no trace of blending 
or combination in souls or any particle that could seem born or fashioned from the 
earth…For in these elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, 
thought, reflection, nothing capable of retaining the past, or foreseeing the future 
and grasping the present, and these capacities are nothing but divine…And indeed 
God Himself…can be comprehended in no other way save as a mind unfettered 
and free, severed from all perishable matter, conscious of all and moving all and 
self-endowed with perpetual motion.32
 
   
 
Personal preferences for a particular philosophical tradition did not prevent 
humanist consolers from utilizing arguments drawn from other traditions for the soul’s 
immortality in their works. The more proof that one could use from different 
                                                 
30 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 7.  
31 King, The Death of The Child, 176-177, 185. 
32 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.27.66-67. 
  
33 
philosophical viewpoints in the support of the cessation of grief, the humanists thought, 
the better.33
The humanists also had to consider the Christian consolatory tradition and, at the 
same time, create with their consolations an “appropriate” balance between it and the 
classical tradition. Though infatuated with the philosophy of pagan writers, most 
humanists were, after all, Christians, and consequently found ways to incorporate their 
faith into their works.
 If the revered philosophies of antiquity, despite their differences, urged the 
bereaved to not bear excessive grief, then how could one, especially a humanist, argue for 
or object to the prudent advice of these time-honored authorities?  
34
 Like that of the classical world, Christianity also offered a rich and varied 
tradition of consolatory works to those suffering from grief, such as the Book of Job and 
the Epistles of Paul from the Bible, as well as the writings of the Latin and Greek Fathers, 
such as Augustine, Jerome, and John Chrysostom:
 
35
 
 
Judeo-Christian thought generally gave spiritual meaning to suffering in 
terms of both its origin and purpose. Death and suffering [were] just punishments 
for Adam’s Fall. Labor and sorrow [were] the wages of sin…Worldly tribulation, 
moreover, [could] also be a vehicle for divine correction…recalling the afflicted 
back to piety.36
 
                       
                                                 
33 King, The Death of The Child, 178-179. 
34 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 9.  
35 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 9-13. 
36 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 9. 
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Placed at the sole discretion of a stern God, the grief and suffering of a Christian 
were the key factors that could lead him or her on the path to spiritual redemption. 
Mourning the adversities of the earthly life was considered much less important than 
bearing them for the sake of the bliss in the Christian afterlife. The only consolation for a 
Christian’s grief laid in accepting divine fate and placing his or her faith “in Christ,” not 
in the deceptive knowledge of pagan philosophers.37
That said, the humanists attempted to reconcile classical and Christian traditions 
in their consolations, by placing ancient philosophy at the service of Christianity. 
Combining “Stoic calm” with “Christian forbearance” and the hierarchical spheres of 
Plato with the Christian Paradise, they showed that the wisdom of ancients, however 
incomplete, could support Christian faith in showing the bereaved the uselessness of 
grief.
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Grappling with its dire emotional effects, Kochanowski turned to the 
philosophical remedies for grief that his humanism offered him first. As his sorrow 
played out in Treny, he discovered that the ancients’ consolatory urgings did not relieve 
his grieving nor provide any new understanding of his child’s death.
  
39 They would leave 
him only with sadness, anger, and despair.     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 King, The Death of the Child, 180. 
38 King, The Death of the Child, 176-178. 
39 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 420. 
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Three: Wisdom Under Fire—Cicero as a Scapegoat for Grief 
 
Realizing the painful futility of the humanists’ consolatory advice, Kochanowski 
found himself turning against humanism, eventually rejecting the philosophical fabric 
that supported their counsel for his grief. He saw the contrasts that existed between what 
his humanism taught him about the nature of sorrow and suffering, and his own reaction 
to them. For him, humanism could not provide Orszula’s death and his subsequent 
mourning a proper “place” in his life as he had lived it, as well as in his ultimate goal of 
consolation. The excruciating ringing of this dissonance was too much for Kochanowski 
to bear. Release and resolution from this situation became an absolute necessity and it 
could only be achieve through rejection.  
Expressing anguish and disdain within the poetic median of Treny, Kochanowski 
utilized ironically his humanist learning to both criticize and reject it at the same time. In 
fact, he had little alternative in his choice, given the paramount role that his humanism 
played in shaping his philosophical and religious development throughout his life.  In this 
plethora of complexities and contradictions surrounding the narrative of Treny, 
Kochanowski’s attack not only exposed the intricate interplay that his humanism had on 
his intellectual development, but also defined its relationship to his literary, 
philosophical, and religious understanding. Not surprisingly, these aspects and the close, 
interrelated dynamic that they played in Kochanowski’s life became the driving force in 
shaping the manner and stylistic choices of both his attempt at self-consolation, and, 
subsequently, his rejection of humanist view of grief.    
How did Kochanowski frame both his rejection of humanist consolation in Treny? 
Humanism did not alleviate his grief. In finding the humanist philosophical solutions to 
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his sorrow completely ineffective and also repugnant, Kochanowski directed his anger 
quite surprisingly at the one person who he felt was responsible for it, Cicero. Not only 
had Cicero been the most perfect representative of the antiquity to Kochanowski, but he 
was also a major shaper of Kochanowski’s own philosophical thought throughout his 
life.1 Kochanowski had read and reread most of Cicero’s works, including the 
Disputationes Tusculanae and the De natura deorum, and drew inspiration from the 
philosophical ideals that the great Roman statesman had propounded in his works.2 
Kochanowski was a scholar of Cicero and had worked on reconstructing several 
fragments of Cicero’s poetry with other humanists while studying at Padua, most notably 
his fellow Pole, Andrzej Patrycz Nidecki.3 Not surprisingly, Cicero’s influence filtered 
itself into most of Kochanowski’s works.  In other words, Cicero had been 
Kochanowski’s hero.4 In light of all of these things, why would Kochanowski direct his 
anger at Cicero and vilify him in Treny? Clearly, Cicero had not caused the death of his 
daughter. In Kochanowski’s eyes, he had done something even worse. Cicero had misled 
him and caused the inconsolability of his grief by providing the philosophical basis to 
Kochanowski’s view of life’s tribulations and also the humanist approach to sorrow and 
consolation. When these philosophical solutions fail to eliminate his grief, Kochanowski 
became convinced that Cicero had “exaggerated man’s position in relation to God, 
raising man above all else, and [by] calling this dignity… [had misled] man tragically.”5
                                                 
1 Stanislaw Lempicki, “Rzecz o Trenach,” Renesans i Humanizm w Polsce: materialy do studiow (Krakow: 
Spoldzielnia Wydawniczo-Oswiatowa, 1952),  211. 
  
2 Stanislaw Grzeszczuk, “Cycero w ‘Trenach’ Jana Kochanowskiego,” Kochanowski i inni: studia 
charakterystyki interpretacje, (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Slask, 1985) 105. Also Weintraub. “The 
Renaissance Manifesto of Kochanowski,” 416-417. 
3 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 418. 
4 Grzeszczuk, “Cycero w ‘Trenach’,” 106. 
5 Donald Pirie, “Lamentationes, Tragoedia, Spes in Jan Kochanowski’s Threny.” Jan Kochanowski in 
Glasgow, ed. Donald Pirie (Glasgow: Campania, 1985), 113. 
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Building upon this realization, Kochanowski focused on exposing the 
philosophical inconsistencies of Cicero. However, by singling out Cicero, Kochanowski 
did not intend to focus merely on the stoic tenets of Cicero. Rather, Cicero would stand as 
representative of all of the follies of classical learning that the humanists had embraced 
and taught, especially philosophy. Much like Cicero had done, Kochanowski would also 
draw freely different philosophical precepts in his critique. To strengthen his case further, 
he added both literary and historical references from the antiquity as examples of how 
others had also faltered and failed under the guidance of philosophy. Fuelled by wrath 
and sorrow, he would spare nothing now in severing his ties to humanism and Cicero. 
Kochanowski’s critique of Cicero itself comes at a very crucial juncture of Treny. 
In the first seven laments of Treny, Kochanowski encompassed his entire immediate 
reaction to Orszula’s death by including a stirring, bittersweet laudatio of her person and 
character.6 Who better qualified than Kochanowski to praise her “maidenly” and 
“virtuous” traits, her poetic promise as a “Safo słowieńska” (Slavic Sappho), and then to 
grieve their untimely loss?7
                                                 
6 Pelc, Kochanowski, 533. 
 For Kochanowski, their loss to him and to all Slavs is the 
chief source of his immediate anger and grief, yet his acknowledgement of Orzsula’s lost 
gifts is also the greatest honor that he could assign to her. It is in transition from this 
bittersweet laudation that his anti-Ciceronian polemic begins to surfaces, just when a 
humanist reader would expect the rational and philosophical debate for the cessation of 
grief. In other words, a change in mood is expected. Under “normal” circumstances, these 
arguments, drawn from eclectic classical sources, would convince and prompt the 
bereaved to realize the futility of sorrow rationally. Echoing Cicero’s advice, philosophy 
7 Pelc, Kochanowski, 538. 
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would conquer the grief, regret, and doubt of humanity. This, however, would not be the 
case with the bereaved Kochanowski, for philosophy had not only failed to conquer his 
grief, but also to explain why Orszula had to die so needlessly. Utilizing his wide 
knowledge of philosophical sources from antiquity, he planned to make sure that his 
“vendetta” against Cicero would be repaid in kind.8 Yet, Kochanowski’s initial reactions 
to grief were not against Cicero. Whereas in the first part of Treny, his “emotion was 
unrestrained and seemingly dependent only upon internal stimuli, Kochanowski now 
[showed] how, when the initial outpouring of grief has somewhat abated, the sufferer 
[began] to respond to external stimuli.”9
 
  
Wielkieś mi uczyniła pustki w domu moim, 
Moja droga Orszulo, tym zniknienim swoim. 
Pełno nas, a jakoby nikogo nie było: 
 Jedną maluczką duszą tak wiele ubyło. 
 
(Your flight, my dearest, caused 
 This vast emptiness in my house. 
We are so many yet no one’s here: 
 One tiny soul and so much is gone.)10
 
 
 
The initial shock of grief had passed for Kochanowski. He realized the greater 
implications associated with Orszula’s death. Having expressed his more unbridled, 
                                                 
8 Pelc, Kochanowski, 553. 
9 Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s Laments,” 41. 
10 Kochanowski. Treny, 18-19. 
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personal emotions (i.e. “internal stimuli”), Kochanowski acknowledged the larger, more 
“external” effect that her loss has taken on his household and outer world. Unfortunately, 
Kochanowski left no account or record of his family life in Czarnolas, detailing more 
precisely his relationship with Orszulo before her death.11 Still, an unmistakable void 
filed his family’s daily life. Yet, as many humanist contemporaries of Kochanowski 
might have objected, why would Kochanowski attach so much importance to a small, 
insignificant child’s (much less that of a girl)?12 Did not the distinguished Roman orator 
Sulpicius himself, they mighthave added, urge Cicero to desist from weeping over “the 
tiny soul” of his daughter Tullia?13
 
 Kochanowski knew these objections, as well as the 
plethora of others, that stated continually a common theme: do not grieve anymore! 
Despite them, it is clear that Orszulo was an essential and vital part of his family and his 
life:  
Tyś za wszytki mówiła, za wzytki śpiewała, 
 Wszytkiś w domu kąciki zawżdy pobiegała 
Nie dopuściłaś nigdy matce sie frasować 
 Ani ojcu myśleniem zbytnim głowy psować 
To tego, to owego wdzięcznie obłapiając 
 I onym swym uciesznym śmiechem zabawiając. 
 
(You spoke and sang for all alone, 
 Skipped around in every corner of the house, 
                                                 
11 Pelc, Kochanowski,  
12 Welch. Jan Kochanowski, 113. 
13 Pelc, Kochanowski, 538. 
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Never let your mother fret, 
 Never let your father brood, 
Hugging one and then the other, 
 Cheering all with joyful laughter.)14
 
 
 
Clearly, Orszula’s death was no mere forgettable trifle. On the contrary, she 
appeared to exude the very being of happiness and life for Kochanowski and his family. 
Although her elevated status here probably was a poetic exaggeration that was typical of 
humanist consolatory works, Orszula was nevertheless considered a worthy subject for 
Kochanowski’s thoughts and pen.15
 
 Her departure itself prevented Kochanowski from 
forgetting this: 
Teraz wszytko umilkło, szczere pustki w domu, 
 Nie masz zabawki, nie masz rośmiać sie nikomu. 
Z każdego kąta żalość czlowieka ujmuje, 
 A serce swej pociechy darmo upatruje. 
 
(Now all is silent, the house stands bare, 
 There’s no laughter, song, or joy. 
From every corner stares remorseless grief 
 As gnawing heartache vainly seeks relief.)16
 
 
                                                 
14 Kochanowski, Treny, 18-19. 
15 Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s Laments,” 37-38. 
16 Kochanowski, Treny, 18-19. 
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Grief over Orszula’s departure, however, also reminded Kochanowski of 
something else of importance, relief. But, how would he find it? This was the question 
that Kochanowski posed himself. His search would have to free him from the thing that 
was “gnawing” at his heart and mind. What was the cause of this “gnawing” then? 
Kochanowski himself mentions and emphasizes it in this poem: Pustki (emptiness). This 
“emptiness” was not only the literal emptiness in Kochanowski’s household that he had 
described. It was also the personal vacuum that Kochanowski felt in understanding the 
deeper meaning of Orszula’s passing away. As his humanist learning and his personal 
preference would have encouraged, Kochanowski turned halfheartedly to Cicero, as a 
guide in this matter, to seek “vainly” for the philosophical understanding that he knew 
could and would not accept. Instead of attacking Cicero immediately, Kochanowski 
turned his anger first on the humanists’ cherished notion of sapientia (wisdom). 
 
Kupić by cię, mądrości, za drogie pieniądze, 
 Która (jesli prawdziwie mienią) wszytki żądre, 
Wszytki ludzkie frasunki umiesz wykorzenić, 
 A czlowieka tylko nie w anioła odmienić, 
Który nie wie, co boleść, frasunku nie czuje, 
 Złym przygodam nie podległ, strachom nie hołduje. 
Ty wszytki rzecy ludzkie masz za fraszkę sobie,  
 Jednaką myśl tak w szcześciu, jako I w żałobie, 
Zawżdy niesiez; ty śmierci namniej sie nie boisz, 
 Bezpieczną, nieodmienną, niepożytą stoisz.  
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(Wisdom, you would be worth a treasure-hoard 
 If—as some hold—you could bar 
All desire, all human cares, making man 
 Almost an angel, who knows no pain, 
Feels no terror, suffers no reverse or strain. 
 You treat all human matters as a game 
And think alike in happiness and grief. 
 Fearless of death, secure, unmoved you stand. 
You measure riches not in gold or land 
 But in contentment and simple needs,)17
 
 
Clearly, Kochanowski’s previous fondness for wisdom (in Polish, mądrośc) had 
changed in light of his grief. In his earlier works, most notably Pieśni, Kochanowski had 
praised the importance of sapientia, citing the practical and philosophical benefits that it 
offered man in all aspects of life.18
                                                 
17 Kochanowski, Treny, 20-21. 
 Yet, Kochanowski had not experienced these benefits 
with the death of his daughter. What explanation could Kochanowski offer for wisdom’s 
failure? Had Cicero and the humanists deceived him? Indeed, Wisdom would have been 
“worth a treasure-hoard” only if its benefits had served their promised purpose in 
Kochanowski’s case. Ironically, the absence of these benefits had become the sole 
criterion in judging wisdom’s worth for Kochanowski. What benefits had Kochanowski 
expected then? Drawing on both the Stoic and Epicurean traditions primarily, 
18 Stanislaw Grzeszczuk, “‘Treny’ Jana Kochanowskiego—Próba Interpretacji.” Kochanowski i inni: studia 
charakterystyki interpretacje (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 1985), 69. 
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Kochanowski listed the very benefits that a pursuit of sapientia should have yielded. 
From them, he had expected to be free from “all desire” and “all human cares”, to know 
“no pain”, to feel “no terror”, nor to suffer “no reverse or strain.” Likewise, he wished to 
“treat all human matters as a game” and, most importantly, to “think alike in happiness 
and grief.”19
 
 Yet, he still felt all these things when his daughter died, despite his efforts in 
searching for wisdom: 
Potrzebami; ty okiem swym nieuchronionym 
 Nędznika upatrujesz pod dachem złoconym, 
A uboższym nie zajźrzysz szcześliwego mienia, 
Kto by jedno chciał słuchać twego upomnienia. 
Nieszcześliwy ja człowiek, którym lata swoje 
 Na tym strawił, żebych był ujźrzał progi twoje 
Terazem nagle z stopniów ostatnich zrzucony 
 I miedzy insze jeden z wiela policzony. 
 
(Your sleepless eye knows who’s wretched 
 Beneath a gilded roof; nor are you jealous 
Of a poor man’s joys— 
   But who heeds your voice? 
I am the wretch who spent his years 
Searching to find your door. 
                                                 
19 Jill Kraye, “Moral Philosophy.” The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. ed. Charles Schmitt 
et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1988),  360-370; 374-386. 
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But now I am hurled from the topmost stair 
 To be counted with the rest.)20
 
 
  Kochanowski had heeded the humanists’ call to search for wisdom and “spent his years” 
studying the works of antiquity to find it, only to be “hurled from the topmost stair” of his 
learning when his daughter died. Now, disappointment and betrayal fueled his skepticism 
of wisdom’s power. Moreover, the failure of sapientia to prevent Kochanowski’s grief 
here reflected the greater problem that he had developed with the humanists’ association 
of philosophy with the pursuit of wisdom.     
The notion of wisdom, however, had been of immense importance to 
Kochanowski and the humanists. Through their rediscovery and thorough study of 
ancient texts, many humanists, such as Petrarch, came to believe that the true and 
undiluted notion of wisdom lay in the “resurrection of the classical ideal.”21 Cicero’s 
dictum, stating that sapientia encompassed “the knowledge of all things human and 
divine,” only spurred them to search further for lost classical works and purify existing 
ones from medieval textual errors and “centuries of dubious exegesis.”22
                                                 
20 Kochanowski, Treny, 20-21. 
 Their 
philological and literary efforts in this regard lead to a rediscovery and revival of many 
philosophical schools of antiquity, such as Platonism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism, as 
well as Aristotelianism. Likewise, this reawakening also led to a “constantly changing 
notion of philosophy, its scope, its purpose, its objects and its methods” within different 
21 Cesare Vasoli, “The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy,” The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy ed. Charles Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 61. 
22 Vasoli, “Concept of Philosophy,” 61. 
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humanist philosophical circles.23 Consequently, these circles’ interpretations of how to 
achieve sapientia and its benefits varied, as did their focuses to toward this matter, 
ranging from the ethical (Stoic and Peripatetic) to the metaphysical (Platonic). Still, the 
key theme among these schools’ approaches to wisdom was “the centrality of [humanity], 
which was reinforced by the preference given to techniques favouring communication 
and persuasive methods” of the humanists.”24
Yet, in using his own failing as an example, Kochanowski presented a 
philosophically eclectic rebuttal to the humanists’ desire to attain sapientia through a 
diligent study of philosophy. While wisdom stood cruelly indifferent to his grief, 
Kochanowski’s suffering over the loss of Orszula continued unabated. By being “counted 
with the rest” of mankind in his failure, Kochanowski saw man’s pursuit of wisdom as 
futile and its benefits useless. His strenuous efforts had proved unrewarding in Orszula’s 
death, when it had mattered most. By dismissing the worth of wisdom’s benefits, 
Kochanowski also dismissed the value of Cicero’s views on the importance of sapientia 
in the humanists’ approach to grief. Yet, Kochanowski’s rejection of wisdom was only 
his first step in challenging Cicero. With her image lingering in his mind continuously, he 
pondered if Cicero had deceived him in other ways, particularly on questions of the 
soul.
  
25
Within the context of a humanist consolatio, the acknowledgement of the soul’s 
immortality was an especially significant argument against the continuation of excessive 
grief.
 
26
                                                 
23 Vasoli, “Concept of Philosophy,” 61. 
 Cicero’s view on the soul and grief had molded this part of the humanists’ 
24 Vasoli, “Concept of Philosophy,” 61-65 
25 Grzeszczuk, “‘Treny’ Jana Kochanowskiego”, 68-69. Pelc, Kochanowski, 542. 
26 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 4-9. 
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approach to consolation. Yet again, philosophy, as Cicero dictated, could provide the 
answer to this difficult question. Different humanist interpretations of classical 
philosophical traditions offered Kochanowski many various perspectives on the 
immortality of the soul to consider. Two “offshoots” of the humanist movement in 
particular, Platonism and Aristotelianism, proposed very influential yet different 
explanations regarding the nature of the soul and played exceptionally important roles in 
debates on this topic during the Renaissance.27 The central problem that differentiated 
these two traditions was whether the use of philosophy could demonstrate definitely the 
existence of an immortal soul.28
 
  
Orszulo moja wdzięczna, gdzieś mi sie podziała? 
 W którą stronę, w którąś sie krainę udała? 
Czyś ty nad wszystki nieba wysoko wniesiona 
 I tam w liczbę aniołków małych policzona? 
Czyliś do raju wzięta? Czyliś na szcseśliwe 
 Wyspy zaprowadzona? Czy cię przez teskliwe 
Charon jeziora wiezie i napawa zdrojem 
 Niepomnym, że ty nie wiez nic o płasczu mojem? 
Czy człowieka zrzuciwszy i myśli dziewicze, 
 Wzięłaś na się postawę i piórka słowicze? 
 
(My fair Orszula, where have you fled? 
                                                 
27 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 126, 134.   
28 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul,” The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy ed. Charles 
Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 499-500. 
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 Are you above the celestial spheres, numbered 
Among angelic hosts? Are you in Paradise? 
 Or are you taken to the Fortunate Isles? 
Does Charon guide you over disconsolate lakes 
 Offering draughts from the erasing stream, 
So you can’t know my tears? 
 Or, shedding human shape and youthful dreams, 
Have you assumed a nightingale’s form and wing?)29
 
 
 Moving away from the Stoic and Epicurean considerations, Kochanowski turned 
to Plato with these exhortations to Orszula.30 In pondering where she had “fled’, 
Kochanowski considered possible fates of her soul. Had she passed through “the celestial 
spheres” of the cosmos to join the “angelic hosts” in “Paradise”? Was she, unaware of her 
father’s grief, still traveling over “disconsolate lakes” with Charon, the boatman of the 
underworld, to reach “the Fortunate Isles”? Or, had she shed “human shape and youthful 
dreams” and taken “a nightingale’s form and wings”? Reflecting these possible “travels” 
of Orszula, Kochanowski considered Platonic conception of the soul’s immortality. An 
important cornerstone of its thought, Plato’s notion of a universal hierarchy where the 
immortal soul ascends back to “its true end” after death marked Platonic philosophy from 
the more materialistic views of other philosophical schools of antiquity concerning the 
soul. 
                                                 
29 Kochanowski, Treny, 22-23.   
In the eyes of most Platonists and their later “descendents”, the Neoplatonists, the 
continuation of the soul after death was a philosophical provable fact that was critical to 
30 Pelc, Kochanowski, 543. 
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interpretations of the Platonic schemes of universal forms and intelligible forms.31 Plato’s 
views on the soul proved extremely influential on among many ancients thinkers, such as 
Cicero, and many early Church Fathers, most notably St. Augustine, as well as later on 
medieval thinkers and the humanists.32 During his humanistic studies in his youth, he had 
studied Plato’s works quite thoroughly with his Cracovian master, Jan of Trzciany. 
Plato’s own descriptions of a universal spiritual hierarchy and the soul’s ascent through it 
as described in his Phaedrus were familiar topics to Kochanowski, as were the 
philosophical writings of the leading Renaissance Platonist, Marsilio Ficino. 33
As its dominant figure, Ficino had shaped largely Renaissance Platonism’s 
approach to grief and consolation, providing its philosophical basis with his masterpiece, 
the Platonic Theology.
          
34 A synthesis of Platonic and Neoplatonic thought, as well as 
incorporating elements from Christian patristic and medieval sources, Ficino’s Platonic 
Theology focused on the immortality of the soul as its central and unifying theme. For 
Ficino, both man’s dignity and purpose in life rested on this notion. What defined this 
purpose for man then? Ficino argued that inspired contemplation was in fact man’s main 
purpose in life. Contemplation was “a spiritual experience” that began when man 
detached his mind “from the outside world,” and turned his thoughts and energies 
towards the eternal Idea.35 Through contemplation, humanity’s soul would raise itself up 
through the ascending hierarchy of reality and return to its true end, God.36
                                                 
31 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 142. 
 In this sense, 
the immortality of the soul was a critical part of Ficino’s Platonism, for it justified “his 
32 Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992) 127-128. 
33 Pelc, Kochanowski, 543-544. 
34 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 142. 
35 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 130. 
36 Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 149-150. Also McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 
142 
  
49 
interpretation of human existence as a continuing effort of contemplation.”37 In carrying 
over this idea to the topic of consolation, Ficino considered excessive grief in humanity 
as a “failure to escape the corporeal for the spiritual, the temporal for the eternal.”38
Ficino proposed the bereaved should take comfort in knowing that the deceased 
has reached a better state of existence, for “the soul has an innate anxiety to return to its 
true end, a longing to transcend the distractions of the corporeal state and to regain the 
beatitude of its proper immortal essence.”
 The 
expression of inconsolable grief was a sign that a person had turned his or her own 
contemplation away from the higher “good” of God to the lesser “good” of material 
concerns. Inconsolable grief thus jeopardized the very future of man’s soul.  
39 In returning to its “true end,” the deceased’s 
soul achieved the greatest good possible: full communion with God. Likewise, the loss of 
the deceased should also not trouble the bereaved because the eternal essence of all souls 
allowed both of them to engage in “consoling spiritual contact.”40 Ficino’s focus of these 
spiritual aspects formed the core of Platonic consolation and inevitably found their way 
into the consolations of many humanists.41
 
 Yet Ficino’s advice did not dispel 
Kochanowski’s anxiety over Orszula. 
Czyś po śmierci tam poszła, kędyś pierwej była, 
 Niżeś sie na mą cieżką żałość urodziła? 
Gdzieśkolwiek jest, jesliś jest, lituj mej załości, 
 A nie możesz li w onej dawnej swej całości, 
                                                 
37 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 130. 
38 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 142. 
39 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 142. 
40 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 146. 
41 King, The Death of The Child, 153. 
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Pociesz mię, jako możesz, a staw sie przede mną 
Lubo snem¸ lubo cieniem, lub marą nikczemną. 
 
(Or in death have you returned 
To where you dwelt before you caused my pain? 
 Wherever you are, if you are, take pity on my grief, 
And if you cannot in the flesh,  
 Console me and appear 
As dream, shade, or vision.)42
 
  
Kochanowski begged Orszula to come to him in the form of a “dream, shade, or 
vision,” and relieved his anxieties over her fate. Only her reassurance of the afterlife 
could ease his pain. Yet, his despair and grief prompted serious doubt in this possibility. 
The unanswerable question, “Did Orszula’s soul really survive death?”, lingered. The 
pivotal moment of his doubting anxiety rested on the words, “wherever you are, if you 
are, take pity on my grief.”43
                                                 
42 Kochanowski, Treny, 22-23. The line irregularities in the English version are due to the translator’s 
stylistic choices, though the original meaning has not changed. 
 Drawing from one of Petrarch’s letters to Cicero, 
Kochanowski showed the inability of Platonism to console with his “if you are” remark. 
The idea of communing with the souls of the dead had not yielded any proof of her 
existence, only miserable silence. The philosophical explanations that had justified the 
reality of a universal hierarchy of forms and the immortality of soul for Ficino and the 
Platonists became all the more doubtful for him. The significance of these few words 
would be immense in Kochanowski’s search for consolation. By calling the notion of the 
43 Pirie, “Lamentationes,”  108. 
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soul’s immortality into doubt, he had questioned the one of basic tenets of his Christian 
faith, an act of blatant heresy.44
                                                 
44 Pelc, Kochanowski, 544. 
 Yet, Kochanowski did not seem concerned with the 
potentially significant spiritual and religious consequences of his doubts. Instead, he 
continued undauntedly against Cicero, even as hope for relief seemed to slip away.    
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Four: “An Eternal Treasure”—the Renaissance Concept of Virtus 
 
The failure of Platonism had shown exposed a flaw of Cicero’s wisdom, but it had 
also plunged Kochanowski even further into philosophical despair over his grief.1
The classical notion of virtus (virtue) was a favored and frequent topic in the 
writings of the humanists. Kochanowski’s understanding of virtus’ relationship to grief 
had been formed from his reading of ancient authors.
 What 
other “remedy” could the humanists offer Kochanowski for his endless anguish? There 
was something still, virtus. Kochanowski had known and worshipped the idea of virtus, 
acquainting himself courtesy of Cicero. But, in his time of grief, could this time-honored 
idea be of any use to Kochanowski? Unfortunately, virtus would also fail the sorrowful 
Kochanowski just as Platonism had.  
2 Despite its currency in their works 
and philosophical discussions, the humanists had no clear consensus on the merits of 
practicing virtus, nor what precisely constituted it, nor even what its relation was in 
relation to religion.3 The interpreters of different classical philosophical traditions of the 
Renaissance had examined virtus, offering praise and criticism. Some humanists, such as 
Leonardo Bruni and Pietro Pomponazzi, celebrated virtus as the key to living a proper 
and meaningful life. Others such as Lorenzo Valla and Juan Luis Vives ridiculed virtus 
instead, calling it an unattainable and impractical goal for humanity to strive for at all.4
                                                 
1 Pirie, “Lamentationes,” 108. 
 
The place of virtus in these different philosophical traditions rested on what they 
2 Teresa Halikowska-Smith, “Kochanowski’s Humanist Philosophy of Life as Reflected in His Pieśni” in 
Jan Kochanowski in Glasgow, ed. Donald Pirie (Glasgow: Campania, 1985), 49-50. 
3 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 325. 
4 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 339-341. 
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considered as man’s summum bonum (supreme good). In this regard, the notion of virtus 
held a central place in Stoicism and Aristotelianism. 
Yet these philosophical traditions understood virtus in different ways by humanist 
interpreters. Nowhere is this better seen than with Aristotelians, for whom happiness was 
humanity’s supreme good in life. Happiness “consisted in the good and proper exercise of 
man’s rational faculty or…the activity of man’s soul in accordance with virtue…”5 
Drawing from the Nicomachean Ethics, many of these interpreters, like Aristotle, 
believed that a perfect attainment of happiness consisted of a balance of the spiritual, 
emotional, and material concerns through “a life-long activity in accordance with virtue 
supplemented by sufficient bodily and external goods.”6
Considering the immense complexity surrounding this balancing act between the 
spiritual and material, the notion of virtus did not consist of one specific action for 
Aristotle and his followers, but rather as an aggregate of “the best and most perfect of the 
[intellective and moral] virtues” that came from both the rational and irrational parts of 
man’s soul.
  
7 Intellective virtues were derived from the rational part of man’s soul, and 
therefore, in Aristotle’s eyes, considered as always good, regardless of how much man 
practiced them, because they were “self-sufficient” from external concerns of the world. 
On the other hand, moral virtues, which stemmed from the irrational part, were 
“disposition[s] to observe the mean to both actions and emotions.”8
                                                 
5 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 330. 
 Humanity’s failure to 
maintain this mean in exercising a moral virtue, either in excess or in scarcity, was 
6 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 330. 
7 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 332-333.  
8 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 338-339. In Aristotle’s view, the intellective virtues were science, art 
practical wisdom or prudence, intelligence, and theoretical wisdom or contemplation of the divine. The 
moral virtues were courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, appropriate ambition, 
gentleness, affability, truthfulness, wittiness, modesty, and justice. See Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 
2.7.1-15. 
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considered as a vice, the opposite of virtue.9 Above all, Aristotle believed that 
contemplation of divine was the best and most perfect virtue and that man should strive 
to attain it. Though Aristotle acknowledged that only a few could achieve happiness 
solely through contemplation and the other intellectual virtues, he thought that every man 
could “reach perfect active or moral happiness” through the practice of moral virtues.10
Followers and commentators of Aristotle’s view on intellective and moral virtues 
generally “accepted and expounded his view, forming the basis for its wide diffusion in 
both philosophical and popular literature.”
      
11 Nonetheless, Aristotle’s division of virtus 
into these two categories also spurred criticism among Renaissance Aristotelians.  
Likewise, Aristotle’s belief that the greatest virtue was the contemplation of celestial and 
divine objects incited a great deal of speculation among them, as well as non-
Aristotelians too.12 Questions surfaced over Aristotle’s criteria on judging the quality of 
virtues, the application of these virtues to man’s condition in the world, and most 
importantly, the validity of Aristotle’s emphasis on the contemplative over the active 
life.13
Though “there was still a core of allegiance to Aristotle’ among these Renaissance 
Aristotelians, “there was also disagreement on fundamental issues” such as this one.
.  
14 In 
this respect, Aristotelianism did not form a single unified entity in the Renaissance, but 
instead was composed of many different “Renaissance ‘Aristotelianisms’.”15
                                                 
9 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2.8.1-3. 
 Amid these 
10 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 336-337. 
11 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 342. 
12 Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 82. 
13 For further treatment of specific individuals’ responses to Aristotle’s approach to virtus, see Kraye, 
“Moral Philosophy,” 332-342.  
14 Charles B. Schmitt, “Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism” in Studies in Renaissance 
Philosophy and Science: V (London: Variorum Reprints, 1981), 160. 
15 Schmitt, “Renaissance Aristotelianism,” 160. 
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numerous and intricate controversies on Aristotle’s notion of virtus, it is not surprising 
that many humanists who could be called Aristotelians, such as Pomponazzi and Nifo, 
took up many eclectic philosophical views from both scholastic and classical traditions 
on this point.16
The Stoics also placed a great deal of importance on the role of virtus in their 
understanding of what humanity’s summum bonum was. However, for the Stoics, virtus 
was the only supreme good of humanity, with vice being the only evil. Virtus consisted of 
“following nature, which [the Stoics] regarded as the immanent manifestation of divine 
reason.”
 To many, like Pomponazzi, Stoicism offered a more appealing approach 
to virtus. 
17 All other things, such as bodily and external concerns, the Stoics considered as 
morally indifferent and unimportant to man’s happiness. Instead of hindering it, the 
misfortunes of humanity, they believed, “provided an ideal opportunity for developing 
and displaying the internal virtue which alone determined human happiness.18 But, how 
would humanity’s emotions play into its practice of virtus amidst these trials and 
tribulations? To this, the Stoics replied that immunity to the emotional consequences of 
these misfortunes was the key to humanity’s pursuit of virtus. Yet, proponents of 
Stoicism did not advocate total emotionlessness or impassivity on man’s part. Rather, 
they emphasized that the expression of rational emotions, such as joy and precaution, 
were in line with the pursuit of virtus, whereas the expression of irrational ones, like fear 
or distress, hindered this pursuit, for these emotions stemmed from passion, not reason.19
                                                 
16 Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 76. 
 
17 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 360. 
18 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 360. 
19 William J. Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance 
Thought,” in A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1990), 32-33. 
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Yet, the Stoic notion of virtus “was not a path to some higher goal but rather was itself 
the sole and self-sufficient aim of humanity’s existence.”20 Through a delicate and 
difficult balance of these tenets, the Stoic could hope to achieve his desired goals of 
virtus and happiness, though only in his or her earthly life. Though considered quite 
rigorous and limiting even in antiquity, Stoicism and its notion of virtus did exert 
considerable influence in the ancient world, as well as later in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance. Given its emphasis on the importance of virtus, Stoicism also drew many 
comparisons to Aristotelianism from both ancient and Renaissance writers and thinkers. 
Indeed, many shared Cicero’s belief “that the Stoics had taken over Peripatetic ethics 
wholesale, merely adopting different names for the same concepts.”21 These thinkers saw 
their similarity in highlighting the importance of virtus to man’s pursuit of the greatest 
good. Yet, others noted that the Stoics’ view of virtus focused solely on the spiritual 
concerns of humanity and ignored its bodily ones, whereas Aristotelians’ view attempted 
to balance both of them. Much like Aristotle’s view, the Stoics’ notion of virtus and its 
relationship to humanity would also become the subject of a substantial amount of 
discussion and criticism from many humanists during the course of their study and 
application of classical thought from ancient texts.22
Although the humanists’ work on ancient texts uncovered previously lost Greek 
sources on Stoicism, such as the Greek philosopher Epictetus, Renaissance thinkers 
formed their knowledge of Stoicism primarily from the Latin works of Seneca and 
Cicero.
   
23
                                                 
20 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 360. 
 Cicero’s De finibus and De officiis proved particularly influential on the 
21 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,”363. 
22 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 360. 
23 Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism,” 29-31. 
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humanists’ understanding of Stoicism and virtus. Again, the weight of Cicero’s 
philosophical eclecticism among the humanists shaped their approach to Stoicism, as it 
had with other philosophical traditions.24
On other hand, those Renaissance and humanist thinkers who disputed the Stoics’ 
promises of happiness believed virtus in itself was not sufficient to ensure humanity’s 
happiness because it was simply too harsh, rigid, and unattainable for humanity. Some 
humanists, such as Montaigne, argued that humanity’s emotions were a natural part of 
him, and could not be separable from his actions.
Based on their individual readings and 
knowledge of ancient works, as well as their religious understanding, these humanists’ 
precise understanding or misunderstanding of Stoic philosophy in many ways determined 
their disposition, whether favorable or not, towards it.  
25 These emotions, in cases such as 
courage and pity, were in fact essential in fostering and leading him to virtus. For these 
humanists, the Aristotelian approach was more moderate and feasible for humanity.26 
Lorenzo Valla, who also found the Aristotelians’ view unsavourable, claimed that the 
Stoics’ view of virtus as its own reward rested on “empty rhetoric” and “a fundamental 
misunderstanding of human nature,” while, in the same time, it ignored the humanity’s 
Christian purpose to seek “the perfect happiness of the next life.”27
Admirers of Stoicism, on the other hand, disagreed. Those humanists, who 
admired the Stoic view of virtus, like Petrarch, praised its stress on eliminating the 
irrational and unnecessary emotions that only misled humanity into vice. Angelo 
 For these humanists, 
humanity was capable of achieving extraordinary things, but not impossible ones.       
                                                 
24 Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 197-200. 
25 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 365-367. 
26 King, The Death of The Child, 183. 
27 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 363, 369. 
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Poliziano, another humanist supporter of Stoic tenets, argued that the Stoic indifference 
to such emotions as grief and anxiety for the sake of virtus, though extremely difficult, 
was certainly “not beyond man’s capacities.”28 Incorporating Stoicism into his 
Aristotelianism, Pietro Pomponazzi further expounded the importance of virtus to the 
dignity of man. Discarding the ideal of contemplation and the possibility of humanity’s 
knowledge of the divine, Pomponazzi maintained that virtus was the greatest ideal that 
man could hope to know and attain during his present life, in process stressing the 
importance of his active life.29 Although knowledge of the immortality of the soul was 
not provable philosophically, and must be taken as an article of faith in Pomponazzi’s 
view, humanity could still find satisfaction and purpose in its present existence through 
virtus.30
How did these humanists console the bereaved with virtus? The consequences of 
grief, they argued simply, caused the bereaved to stray from virtus and its intended good. 
Instead, the bereaved should utilize the benefits of virtus in coping with and eliminating 
the pain and sorrow of their grief. Quite often, they would justify these points by 
including Stoic views towards grief almost always in their consolation.
 Thus, humanity’s dignity and place in the universe, combined with virtus, 
allowed it to overcome any material misfortunes and emotional tribulations, even the 
agonies of grief. Naturally, humanist consolers did not hesitate in also incorporating the 
notion of virtus into the philosophical “arsenal” of their consolations.  
31
                                                 
28 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 364. 
 From a Stoic 
perspective, the expression of grief was a vice that stemmed from the irrational and 
sensual emotions of humanity, hence deviated from nature and was not pertinent to 
29 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 136-137. 
30 Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 108-109. 
31 King, The Death of The Child, 184.  
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humanity’s pursuit of virtus.32 Consequently, the bereaved must block out and ignored 
grief as a test of true virtus. Petrarch, echoing this Stoic belief in many of his letters and 
works, especially his De remediis utriusque fortune, urged those grieving to remember 
“the importance of arming the mind with fortitude and courage, turning from the 
sensual,” for man’s “sobs and laments do not come from nature, but only 
from…cowardice.”33 Likewise, these “Stoic” consolers emphasized that death was an 
inevitable part of existence, one decreed by both nature and the will of God, and thus it 
was futile for humanity to grieve.34 Since it also came from nature, virtus simply could 
not exist with grief and sorrow. Hence, the solution to grief was simple: “bear and 
forebear” all for virtue.35
Those looking for a more “moderate” approach to consoling grief than what 
Stoicism had to offer could turn to the Peripatetics. Since “emotions were natural, indeed 
essential to human beings,” the Peripatetics allowed the bereaved to express grief as a 
natural response to balancing the needs of the body with those of the soul.
 For the Stoic, there could not be any middle ground in grief. 
36 Although 
coming from the irrational part of man, grief was a natural response to a rational and 
“good” emotion, profound love for the deceased. By “weeping” moderately, the bereaved 
could find “a remedy for the mitigation and amelioration of sorrow and sadness” and 
eventually return to the virtuous mean.37
                                                 
32 Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism,” 41. 
 However, grief did have its limits for the 
Peripatetics. An excessive or immoderate amount of grief was an obvious sign that one 
33 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 40-41. 
34 King, The Death of The Child, 182. 
35 Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 364. 
36 King, The Death of The Child, 182. 
37 King, The Death of The Child, 183. 
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had strayed from his or her pursuit of virtus. By remaining inconsolably sorrowful, the 
bereaved would also jeopardize their ultimate goal, happiness.  
As an ardent follower of Cicero, Kochanowski placed exceptional importance on 
the notion of virtus. Quite expectedly, he had learned and formed his understanding of 
virtus primarily from his readings of Cicero. Holding it above all others “gifts” from the 
ancients, virtus occupied the most important place in his philosophical, moral, and 
religious understanding of the world.38 Additionally, Francesco Robortello, one of his 
Paduan masters, could have also shaped Kochanowski’s strong attachment to this 
classical notion during his studies. Famous for his literary scholarship, especially his 
commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, Robortello was well known among the students of 
Padua for strong emphasis on grammatical correctness and eloquence, as well as for his 
high opinion of himself as a humanist.39 Also, he was an adherent to the Stoic notion of 
virtus and would not have hesitated in inserting his philosophical perspectives into his 
lectures on poetry.40 Though he did hold the professorship of moral philosophy in Padua 
until 1561 (after Kochanowski had already left Padua), Robortello could have contributed 
to the infusion and emphasis of the Stoic notion of virtus into Kochanowski’s poetry later 
on.41
Naturally, Kochanowski came to praise this ancient ideal almost ubiquitously 
throughout his poetic works.
     
42
 
 In his Pieśni, written only a few years before Treny, he 
presented exactly how important virtus was not only to him, but also to all of mankind:    
                                                 
38 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 418. Grzeszczuk, “Cycero w ‘Trenach’,” 105. 
39 Pelc, Kochanowski, 448. 
40 Kot, “Jana Kochanowskiego podroze i studia,” 224-225. 
41 Grendler, Universities of the Italian Renaissance, 400. 
42 Grzeszczuk, “Cycero w ‘Trenach’,” 106-107. 
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Cnota - skarb wieczny, cnota - klenot drogi, 
Tegoć nie wydrze nieprzyjaciel srogi, 
Nie spali ogień, nie zabierze woda; 
Nad wszystkim inszym panuje Przygoda. 
 
(Virtue, an eternal treasure; virtue, the greatest good. 
  A jewel no ruthless rogue could easily take, 
 Nor fire burn, nor wild waters sweep;  
  A constant guardian in any adventure one undertakes. )43
 
  
Echoing a dominant Stoic theme from Cicero’s works here, such as the De finibus 
and the Paradoxa stoicorum, Kochanowski believed that virtus (in Polish, cnota) was the 
greatest good that humanity could hope to achieve, for it resisted all misfortune and 
tribulations that life might bring.44 Following Cicero’s advice, he believed that virtus was 
attained through the careful study and deliberate application of philosophy.45 Indeed, 
Kochanowski held the tenets of Stoicism in high regard, and put them into practice in his 
own life. For him, the Stoics’ emphasis on virtus dictated the most proper and useful way 
to lead one’s life. Kochanowski, however, was by no means a “cold-hearted” Stoic 
ascetic. “The Stoic ethics” of Kochanowski “had a strong Ciceronian tinge.”46
                                                 
43 Jan Kochanowski, Pieśni in Dzieła Wybrane, eds. Wojciech Rzehak and Anna Popławska (Krakow: 
Wydawnictwo GREG), 39. No date available. Translation mine. 
 Like 
Cicero, he picked aspects of Stoicism that appealed to him, including them with other 
philosophical tenets that he liked. Throughout his earlier works, especially Fraszki and 
44 Grzeszczuk, “‘Treny’ Jana Kochanowskiego,” 70-71. 
45 Grzeszczuk, “‘Treny’ Jana Kochanowskiego,” 71. 
46 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,”418. 
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Pieśni, Kochanowski praised, in quite Epicurean fashion, the joy of laughter and gentle 
frivolity with friends, the blissful pain of love and lust, as well as the pleasures of food 
and drinks.47 On a less material level, he also highlighted the emotional pleasure that 
came from the admiration of the physical beauty of the world. Though he advocated these 
un-Stoic activities, Kochanowski urged also quite explicitly the need for moderation 
while engaging in them.48
The practice of moderation was an ideal that had permeated through the 
philosophies and literature of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Kochanowski also 
incorporated other influences into his approach to moderation as well.
 This was where virtus would come in as an aid and guide. For 
the material enjoyments of life, Kochanowski seemed to take on a very “Peripatetic” 
approach to virtus, underscoring the necessity of following the moral mean in 
“indulging” in these activities. These things would remain “goods,” so long as they were 
done with the proper temperament.  
 49 Horace, one of 
Kochanowski’s beloved Latin poets, had stressed in his Odes the importance of “the 
Golden Mean” in enjoying the physical pleasures of life. Additionally, other Renaissance 
and humanist thinkers, such as Ficino, had considered moderation as one of most 
important universal values for man.50
Kochanowski’s notion of virtus reserved the Stoics’ insistence on emotional 
passivity for feelings that he considered as negative and harmful. In following this two-
 Nonetheless, when it came to more “abstract” 
applications of moral virtues, Kochanowski’s eclectic understanding of virtus turned with 
full force to the Stoics. 
                                                 
47 Pelc, Kochanowski, 350-351 
48 Pelc, Kochanowski, 354. 
49 Halikowska-Smith, “Kochanowski’s Humanist Philosophy,” 49. 
50 Halikowska-Smith, “Kochanowski’s Humanist Philosophy,” 50. 
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fold understanding of virtus, Kochanowski believed that humanity would developed a 
greater sense of piety and fulfillment that would lead it the ultimate goal of happiness, 
God.51 For him, vices were any emotions that caused humanity to depart from this path, 
as well as to engage in actions that were harmful to it and others. Jealousy, greed, pride, 
hypocrisy, ignorance, and religious intolerance were among the many vices, in 
Kochanowski’s eyes, that the Stoic notion of virtus would purge from its devoted 
followers.52
Yet, Kochanowski realized with his daughter’s death “the gulf between 
philosophy and real life,” and wrote bitterly as his notion of virtus crumpled before the 
agonies of his grief:
 Equally, the most painful or adversities like death and grief or even the best 
of fortunes such riches and health would not disturb the well-being of the virtuous man 
that Kochanowski had envisioned in his reading of Cicero. The benefits of virtus would 
be the keys that allowed any man, from the highest noble to the simplest peasant, to 
overcome even the worst of all tragedies.  
 53
 
 
‘Fraszka cnota’—powiedział Brutus porażony. 
 Fraszka, kto sie przypatrzy, fraszka z każdej strony. 
 Kogo kiedy pobożność jego ratowała? 
 Kogo dobroć przypadku złego uchowała? 
 
(Virtue: a trifle!—stricken Brutus found. 
 A trifle, if you see it in the round. 
                                                 
51 Halikowska-Smith, “Kochanowski’s Humanist Philosophy,” 52. 
52 Grzeszczcuk, “Przy pogrzebie rzecz—Konspekt intelektuakny Trenów,” 140.   
53 Halikowska-Smith, “Kochanowski’s Humanist Philosophy,” 53.  
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Has piety ever brought salvation? 
 A lurking foe entangles men’s affairs 
With no distinction between good and bad.)54
 
 
Virtus became utterly a “trifle.” Hit with the full irony of his situation now, all of 
his former praise of virtus as a “treasure” became muted, and all of his effort to follow it, 
wasted. How did he defend the harsh irony of his point here? Had virtus deceived her 
followers before him? Had her high ideals failed them just as they had failed 
Kochanowski? Yes, it had, Kochanowski realized. Virtus had also failed the virtuous 
Marcus Brutus, the assassin of Caesar and a friend of Cicero. The ever-faithful Roman 
republican would now serve as Kochanowski’s companion in misery. 55
 
 Brutus, like 
Kochanowski, had too placed his faith in virtus, allowing it to guide his emotions and 
actions towards a proper and morally rewarding life. A model of virtuous living, Brutus 
himself had garnered the admiration of his fellow peers. So strong was Brutus’ dedication 
and faith in virtus that it convinced him of the “good” in ending the tyranny of his close 
friend, Julius Caesar. But, in the end, virtus did not reward him for his faithfulness. 
Instead, it had heaped every kind of disgrace and misery on Brutus. His “piety” had not 
carried with it moral “salvation” that he had sought. Just as it had failed Brutus, now 
virtus had also failed Kochanowski. Why had virtus let both him and Brutus down? The 
reason, Kochanowski recognized, was very simple, for it applied to all who sought virtus: 
Nieznajomy wróg jakiś miesza ludzkie rzecy, 
 Nie mając ani dobrych, ani złych na pieczy. 
                                                 
54 Kochanowski, Treny, 24-25. 
55 Pelc, Kochanowski., 541. 
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Kędy jego duch więnie, żaden nie ulęże: 
 Praw li, krzyw li, bez braku każdego dosięże. 
A my rozumy swoje przedsię udać chcemy. 
 Hardzi miedzy prostaki, że nic nie umiemy, 
Wspinamy sie do nieba, Boże tajemnice 
 Upatrując; ale wzrok śmiertelnej źrzenice 
Tępy na to; sny lekkiem, sny ploche nas bawią, 
 Które sie nam pobobno nigdy nie wyjawią. 
 
(That spirit blows and none is spared: 
Neither the righteous nor the knave. 
 Hiding our folly, we flaunt our wits 
To dazzle simple souls. We climb 
 To heaven, spying on God’s mysteries, 
But the sight of mortal eyes 
 Proves dim. Scant, fleeting dreams 
Tease us, their sense unguessed.)56
 
              
 Humanity’s prideful arrogance was the source for virtus’ failure. Having believed 
that the virtuous would be free from pain and suffering, Kochanowski realized in his grief 
now that the misfortunes of life spared “neither the righteous nor the knave.” Regardless 
of virtus, all of humanity was doomed to suffer and react from the emotions of pain and 
loss. Since there was nothing that humanity can do to prevent suffering, why had it tried 
                                                 
56 Kochanowski. Treny. 24-25. 
  
66 
so hard for centuries to overcome it with something called virtus? Once more, 
Kochanowski blamed those who, like himself, foolishly thought that humanity had the 
capacity to conquer all obstacles of this world. Yet, these men still continued to “climb to 
heaven,” trying to learn “God’s mysteries” with their philosophical speculations and 
unrealistic ideals (like virtus), all at the urging of Cicero.57
No, Kochanowski answered, for humanity’s comprehension “proves dim” in 
matters concerning God and nature. Virtus had clearly been wrong about guiding man 
through the troubles of emotional despair. What good did such misguided notions do 
humanity if they ultimately failed him? Echoing Petrarch’s own earlier qualms 
concerning man’s ignorance, he added that all things that man did happen to learn were 
just “scant fleeting dreams,” whose meaning remained “unguessed” to him. Yet, whom 
was Kochanowski trying to belittle specifically with these anti-intellectual invectives 
against humanity? Following the spirit of Petrarch’s On His Own Ignorance, 
Kochanowski questioned the flawed expectations that ambitious Renaissance thinkers, 
like the Aristotelians, held about learning the inner most workings of nature, humanity, 
and God through the power of philosophy.
 Could humanity truly discover 
any definitive answers or solutions from these activities, or even understand them?  
58
                                                 
57 Pelc, Kochanowski., pp. 541-542; also Grzeszczuk, “‘Treny’ Jana Kochanowskiego.”, p. 76. 
 Kochanowski’s targets included individuals 
and groups that had dabbled in these pointless “guessing games” of philosophy, such as 
the Stoics and their virtuous equanimity or the Platonists and their communion with God. 
Moreover, Kochanowski’s fellow humanists were as just as much to blame for his pain 
for cultivating and celebrating this pernicious spirit of man’s superiority through their 
58 Petrarch dealt with the topic of man’s ignorance and presumption in his work. See Pelc, Kochanowski, 
542. For Petrarch’s On His Own Ignorance, see Ernst Cassirer et al., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 47-133.    
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studies.59 Only in the firm grip of misfortune did Kochanowski grasp that he had been a 
part of this humanist falsehood. But now as a victim of his pride, he saw that everything 
that had held so dear now appeared grossly flawed.60
 
 The Stoic promises that he had 
sought from virtus proved empty. All of the wisdom that he had learned from his studies 
of antiquity seemed false. The beauty of both man and the universe looked ugly and 
deformed. Kochanowski had shown that Cicero’s belief in philosophy was false again. 
Out of this “rubble” of intense mental turmoil, Kochanowski was left with one thing 
only: 
Żałości, co mi czynisz? Owa już oboje 
 Mam stracić: i pociechę, i baczenie swoje? 
 
(Despair, what have you done? Am I 
To lose both joy and reason?)61
 
 
“Despair” from Orszula’s loss still loomed over him. Kochanowski had 
effectively refuted the value and place of virtus in his life. The wisdom of the ancients 
had not soothed his grief, nor provided any understanding as to why it still lingered. At 
this point, he asked himself once more why he had not been consoled. Yet, the gap that 
separated the expected and the actual benefits of Cicero’s philosophical advice 
aggravated him even more, and plunged him into even further doubt and despair. Could 
he still find fault with Cicero? Was there anything else he could say against his Roman 
                                                 
59 Pelc, Kochanowski, 542. 
60 Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s ‘Laments’,”.43-44. 
61 Kochanowski, Treny, 24-25. 
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hero and would his anger still be justified? Could he salvage his humanist worldview? 
Before he could decide, Kochanowski would have to answer a paramount question that 
he himself had posed: was all “joy and reason” lost from his life?  
  
69 
Five: The Final Test of “Reason” and “Emotion” 
 
In pondering the potential loss of his “reason,” Kochanowski turned yet again to 
his memories of Orszula to seek a possible answer. Perhaps, he thought, nostalgic 
reflections of his dead daughter would return hope to his sunken state. Kochanowski’s 
recollections of Orszula had only reaffirmed and showed how severe his grief and despair 
had become up to this point. Kochanowski once more returned to praising Orszula’s 
character, reminding him as well as others, of how the strength of her character as a 
daughter had spurred both his intense love and grief.  
 
Żaden ociec podobno barziej nie miłował 
 Dziecięcia, żaden barziej nad mię nie żałował 
A też ledwie sie kiedy dziecię urodziło 
 Co by łaski rodziców swych tak godne było: 
 
(No father loved his daughter more, 
 Nor mourned her more than I do mine; 
But was there ever such a child 
 So worthy of her parents’ care?1
 
 
In his eyes, “no father” had “loved” nor “mourned” his daughter as much as 
Kochanowski has in Treny. Of course, his claim here was poetic license obviously, but 
also completely consistent with his development of a profound sense of self-pity that 
                                                 
1 Kochanowski, Treny, 26-27. 
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justified his reaction.2 Lamenting even further, he listed her filial virtues, her piety, her 
parental obedience, and her panieńskie (maidenly and domestic) ways that Orszula had 
exhibited even in her young age.3
 
 Death had forever removed the promise of a truly 
upright and noble woman from Orszula. How could anyone, especially the humanists, not 
grieve to the same extent as Kochanowski had for such a loss? Despite remembering 
these qualities of his daughter, he still could not find “joy” in these memories, realizing 
that her lost was truly permanent: 
Bo już nigdy nie wznidziesz ani przed mojema 
 Wiekom wiecznie zakwitniesz smutnemi oczema. 
 
(Burying my hopes 
In saddest ground; 
 For never will you rise, 
Never bloom 
 Before my grieving eyes.)4
 
     
 The permanence of Orszula’s loss continued to plague him with constant 
hopelessness. “Joy,” now he claimed, had become an impossibility for him when she had 
departed.5
 
 
                                                 
2 Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s ‘Laments’,” 41. 
3 Kochanowski, Treny, 26-27. 
4 Kochanowski, Treny, 26-27. 
5 Mersereau, Jr., “Jan Kochanowski’s ‘Lament’,” 42-43. 
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Wzięlaś mi, zgoła mówiąc, dusze połowicę, 
 Ostatek przy mnie został na wieczną tesknicę. 
 
(You took, I vow, half my soul; 
 The rest you drowned in endless woe.)6
 
 
Where would this “endless woe” lead Kochanowski? He had feared that he had 
lost “reason” in his earlier attack on virtus. Despair rested on this fear. But, what was this 
“reason” to him? Though vague within the context of Treny, what Kochanowski 
considered as “reason” was the exact thing he had been criticizing, the philosophical 
basis of his worldview that humanism had helped shape.7 Ironically, the same person 
who was now the “villain” of Treny, Cicero, had once been the pinnacle of “reason.”8
Kochanowski’s inconsolability of his grief fully evoked his wrath towards Cicero 
to the surface. Again, he stated the same reason for his quarrel with Cicero, but also hint 
at the costs that he was ready to pay for his unrelenting grief: 
 
The inextinguishable emotions of his grief impelled Kochanowski to put forth his most 
virulent and personal polemic against Cicero, a culmination of his entire critique against 
the philosophical dictates of his former hero, testing once more his humanist 
commitments. 
 
Nieszcześciu kwoli a swojej żałości, 
Która mię prawie przejmuje do kości, 
                                                 
6 Kochanowski, Treny, 28-29. 
7 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 421. 
8 Grzeszczuk, “Cycero w ‘Trenach’,” 107. 
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Lutnią i wdzięczny rym porzucić muszę, 
 Ledwe nie duszę.  
 
(In my misfortunes and sorrow, 
Which pierce me to the marrow, 
I must forsake my lute and scroll, 
 Perhaps my soul.)9
      
     
The costs were indeed tremendous: in seeking to understand his “misfortunes and 
sorrow” for Orszula’s death, he had found no solace in his two most prized possessions, 
the “lute” of his poetic talents and the “scroll” of his humanist learning. Kochanowski 
had used his poetry as a vehicle for celebrating philosophical dictates that intrinsically 
tied to his classical learning before Orszula’s death. But in his reflection of grief, their 
blatant impotence to console became all too apparent to Kochanowski. His solution was 
to forsake both of them altogether. Kochanowski the poet and Kochanowski the humanist 
would become figments of a sorrowful and bitter past.10 In alluding to his rejection of his 
most defining roles, he also acknowledged the possibility that he was endangering his 
soul. Kochanowski’s introduction to the philosophies of antiquity, as well as their 
Renaissance interpreters, had had a profound effect in shaping and tying his religious 
understanding of humanity.11
                                                 
9 Kochanowski, Treny, 34-35. 
 The conundrum that Kochanowski faced in this choice was 
undoubtedly difficult. Yet, were his remarks just a poetic exaggeration of the severity of 
10 Pelc, Kochanowski, 545. 
11 Wiktor Weintraub, “Religia Kochanowskiego a polska kultura renesansowa,” in Rzecz czarnoleska 
(Krakow: Wydawn. Literackie, 1977), 241-242.  
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his grief, one typical of other humanist consolatory works?12
 
 Or, were they a definitive 
declaration of his resolve to “forsake” the very things he had once so cherished?  
Żywem, czy mię sen obłudny frasuje? 
Który kościanym oknem wylatuje, 
A ludzkie myśli tym i owym bawi,  
 Co błąd na jawi. 
 
(Am I awake? Are these delusive dreams, 
Flying through the Ivory Gate, 
Beguiling human thoughts, 
 At waking—nought?)13
 
         
 Kochanowski questioned the rationale of his doubts about humanism. Perhaps, he 
thought, the harshness of his grief had led him astray in deciding to reject the previous 
security of his humanism. After all, his knowledge of classical philosophy had long 
served as his guide to “reason.” Were his strained emotions perhaps deluding his 
judgment and “beguiling” his thoughts with “delusive dreams” of moral decay? More 
importantly, did his grief justify the potential outcome of such a bold rejection? 
Kochanowski would not allow the philosophical “traps” of Cicero and his humanism to 
snare him into any further sorrow.  “Paradoxically,” Kochanowski used this “moment of 
                                                 
12 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 20-21. 
13 Kochanowski, Treny, 34-35. 
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uncertainty and unclarity” in order to illustrate its own irrational futility and to dispel any 
traces doubts in him as to what had so deceptively been the “source of his misfortune”14
 
:     
O błędzie ludzki, o szalone dumy, 
Jako to łacno pisać sie rozumy, 
Kiedy po wolej świat mamy, a głowa 
 Człowieku zdrowa. 
 
W dostuatku będąc, ubóstowo chwalemy, 
W rozkoszy—żalość lekce szacujemy,  
A póki wełny skąpej przadce zstaje, 
 Śmierć nam za jaje.  
 
(Oh human error, foolish pride! 
How quick to reason 
When things go well, 
 The head not ill. 
 
Wealthy—we laud the poor, 
Content—we sport with sorrow, 
While the mean spinner weaves— 
 Death’s a joke.)15
                                                 
14 Pirie, “Lamentationes,” 112. 
 
15 Kochanowski, Treny, 34-35.  
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Tossing aside the “reason” of antiquity for the last time, Kochanowski blames his 
and humanity’s pride for his troubles. It had been pride that, in his time of “content,” had 
lead to believe that the human knowledge could eliminate the adversities that faced 
humanity. The wisdom of ancient philosophy he had once praised would bring happiness 
to all, regardless if they were “wealthy” or “poor.”16
 
 Did not the Stoics, as Kochanowski 
had cited frequently, that one must bear such troubles without feeling a measure of pain? 
Similarly, it had also been pride that had fooled him into thinking “Death’s a joke.” 
Unfortunately, he had already learned the terrible cost that both he and humanity would 
suffer when tragedy actually came and ancient wisdom disappeared: 
Lecz kiedy nędza albo żal przypadnie, 
Ali żyć nie tak jako mówić snadie, 
A śmierć dopiero w ten czas nam należy, 
 Gdy już k nam bieży. 
 
(But faced with loss or dearth, 
We tangle words and deeds 
And notice Death 
 When she’s too near.)17
 
       
                                                 
16 Stanislaw Grzeszczuk, “Przy pogrzebie rzecz—konspect intelektualny Trenów,” in Jan Kochanowski: 
Interpretacje, ed. Jan Błoński, (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1985), 138. 
17 Kochanowski, Treny, 34-35.  
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Confronted with the stark reality of Orszula’s death, Kochanowski had tangled 
both “words and deeds,” realizing the full extent of human fickleness.18
 
 When he 
attempted to console himself, he discovered that his philosophical knowledge provided 
no salubrious effects. His pursuit of steadfast happiness through philosophy had proved 
quixotic and vain. Instead of being “Stoic” in resisting them, Kochanowski had fallen 
into the “foolishness” of his grief and despair. Despite his efforts to emulate him, 
Kochanowski had nevertheless failed this master Cicero in the end. Or, perhaps it was 
Cicero’s principles that had been flawed when confronted with adversity and loss. 
Kochanowski’s own experience had shown this quite dramatically. But, had these 
principles also failed others? Indeed, Kochanowski knew that they had already failed 
another person before:   
Przecz z płaczem idziesz, Arpinie wymowny 
Z miłej ojczyzny? Wszak niw Rzym budowny, 
Ale świat wszystek Miatem jest mądremu 
 Widzeniu twemu. 
 
Czemu tak barzo córki swej żałujesz? 
Wszak sie ty tylko sromoty wiarujesz; 
Insze wszelakie u ciebie przygody 
 Ledwie nie gody. 
 
(Why weep, fluent Arpinas, when fleeing 
                                                 
18 Grzeszczuk, “Przy pogrzebie rzecz,” 140. 
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From home—if not just towering Rome 
But the whole world lies 
 Beneath your learned eyes? 
 
Why do you mourn your daughter so? 
Since you only fear disgrace, 
Your other perturbations— 
 But a celebration!)19
 
       
  The same principles that Cicero had advocated to others in their times of 
adversity, loss, and, most especially, grief, had failed him too, Kochanowski replied. 
Cicero had said that a “learned” Stoic man was at home anywhere in the world; hence he 
should not fear exile or the loss of his home.20
                                                 
19 Kochanowski, Treny, 34-35. 
 Still, when “Arpinas” had been banished 
from the homely comforts of “towering” Rome, did he not “weep” bitterly in spite of his 
wisdom. But for Kochanowski, this personal failing was still petty. Enraged, he jabbed at 
Cicero with another example of his personal failures that was even more painful, one they 
both shared tragically: the death of a daughter. When Cicero’s beloved daughter Tullia 
died, he too had wept bitterly. But, caustically, Kochanowski asked, “Why do you mourn 
your daughter so?” Did not Cicero “fear” the “disgrace” and vice that came those who 
could not control their emotions? Did not Cicero’s belief in the immortality of Tullia’s 
soul give him solace? Perhaps, both Kochanowski and Cicero had not reacted so 
differently to the death of their daughters. Nonetheless, Kochanowski still continued to 
20 Grzeszczuk, “‘Treny’ Jana Kochanowskiego,” 87. 
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belittle Cicero for calling the miserable “perturbations” of life “but a celebration!” 
Cicero’s evident hypocrisy would carry Kochanowski’s own disillusionment and pen to a 
new level of spite.21
 
   
Śmierc, mówisz, straszna tylko niezbożnemu; 
Przeczże sie tobie umrzeć cnotliwemu 
Nie chciało, kiedyś prze dotkliwą mowę 
 Miał podać głowé? 
 
(‘Death’, you say, ‘scares the wicked’. 
Yet, though virtuous, you were loath 
To die when your stern debate 
 Confirmed your fate.)22
 
              
Mockingly, he himself turned now to console Cicero with the “virtuous” Roman’s 
advice and actions. Reiterating his sentiments on death in his Tusculan Disputations, 
Kochanowski pointed out emphatically that the “wicked” only fear the coming of death.23 
Though brave in challenging Marcus Antonius in “stern debate,” Cicero was “loath” to 
face the consequences of his own words. Though remembered as fearless Stoic, he had 
died a coward.24
                                                 
21 Grzeszczuk, “Cycero w ‘Trenach’,” 414. 
 Had Cicero feared “Death” perhaps because he himself had been 
22 Kochanowski, Treny, 34-35. 
23 Cicero Tusculan Disputations 2.4.12 
24 Kochanowski probably drew on a work by Asinius Pollio, an enemy of Cicero, for this account of 
Cicero’s death. For other, more favorable and perhaps accurate accounts of Cicero’s death, see Seneca, 
Suasoria 6.15ff. 
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“wicked”? Had he, like Kochanowski, failed to resist sorrow and grief, despite all of his 
sapientia and virtus? Again, Kochanowski provided Cicero an appropriate response.       
 
Wywiódłeś wszytkim, nie wywiódłeś sobie; 
Łacniej rzec, widzę, niż czynić i tobie, 
Pióro anielskie; duszę toż w przygodzie, 
 Co i mnie bodzie. 
 
(You’ve proved to all, but not  
Yourself—you too, angelic scribe, 
Cannot match deeds to words when your soul, 
Like mine, is fouled.)25
 
 
Reflecting his larger argument against humanity, Kochanowski revealed that 
inconsistency was Cicero’s chief failing, much as it had been for him. Their 
inconsistency in following and keeping the dictates of philosophy had prevented their 
minds from not being “fouled” by grief.26
 
 All of the philosophical knowledge of 
humanity would fail it in adversity. Only blatant hypocrisy in “deeds” and words” would 
remain. With this realization lingering, Kochanowski left his former master a final piece 
of advice:  
Człowiek nie kamień, a jako sie stawi 
                                                 
25 Kochanowski, Treny, 35-37 
26 Lempicki, “Rzecz o ‘Trenach’,” 216.  
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Fortuna, takich myśli nas nabawi. 
Przeklęte szczeście! Czy snać gorzej duszy, 
 Kto rany ruszy? 
 
(Man’s not a stone, Fortune dictates 
Our thoughts. Accursed fate! 
Does the soul smart more 
 When you rub the sore?)27
 
        
Paradoxically rejecting wisdom of antiquity by affirming that “man’s not a stone,” 
Kochanowski offered Cicero, as well as humanity, a fateful reminder that the well being 
of humanity rises and falls at the whim of “Fortune.”28
 
 The “accursed fate” of humanity 
prevented it from resisting the emotions that came from pleasure or pain. Nevertheless, as 
Kochanowski realized painfully, Cicero and the humanists were the ones guilty of 
deceiving humanity with their “gifts” of philosophy, falsely telling it to strive for divine 
perfection. Their efforts only aggravated the “sore” of humanity when death and 
suffering came. Kochanowski knew that he shared their guilt, and, through suffering too 
much for having held on their foolishness, rejected his humanism.  
Czasie, pożądnej ojcze niepamięci, 
W co ani rozum, ani trafią święci, 
Zgój smutne serce, a ten żal surowy 
                                                 
27 Kochanowski, Treny, 36-37. 
28 Cicero Tusculan Disputations 3.6.12-13. 
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 Wybij mi z głowy. 
 
(Father of sweet oblivion, Time! 
Come where saints and reason fail,  
Heal a sad heart and bring relief 
 From this tormenting grief.)29
 
   
His “reason,” his humanism, had failed to console him over Orszula’s death. The 
emotion of Kochanowski’s grief proved too powerful and incompatible of a foe to 
overcome. The hostile tension between the two that his grief had created would be 
irreconcilable and permanent. His devotion to Cicero and the philosophies of antiquity, 
his “saints,” had only made him agonize over her death more, failing to bring him 
understanding for her death. Pride blinded him to the reality of the world. Tragically, 
both had shattered his faith in the dignity of humanity, simply by not alleviating the 
complete nature of his loss and resulting grief.30
 
  
Even as he rejected humanism and Cicero, Kochanowski suffered from 
“tormenting grief.” He received no solace for tossing his prized “reason” away. Left in 
the hand of the “father of sweet oblivion,” perhaps only “Time” would “bring relief” and 
offer something that could “heal” Kochanowski’s “sad heart” at last.   
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Kochanowski, Treny, 36-37. 
30 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 423. 
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Epilogue:  
After bitterly and grievously rejecting his humanism, did Kochanowski find 
solace for his grief somewhere in Treny? Rejecting the philosophical consolations that his 
humanism offered him, Kochanowski at last looked to his “neglected” Christian faith for 
repose in the midst of his distress. 
 
A ja zatym łzy niech leję, 
 Bom stracił wszytkę nadzieję, 
 By mnie rozum miał ratować, 
 Bóg sam mocen to hamować. 
 
(So I’ll shed tears 
 Having lost all hope 
 To be saved by reason. 
 Only God halts pain.)1
  
 
 After losing “all hope” in the “reason” of his humanism, Kochanowski realized 
that only God could cease his “tears” and “pain” in a sudden moment of faith. In 
searching deep within himself for his grief’s cure, he recognized that humanity’s “virtue 
and happiness… [came] entirely from God.”2
                                                 
1 Kochanowski, Treny, 40-41. 
  However, the God of Kochanowski’s 
Treny was quite different from the God of his “Czego chcesz od nas, Panie” (“What do 
2 Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism,” 51. 
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you do want from us, Lord”). Not surprisingly, personal tragedy was at the heart of this 
change.3
 
      
 
My nieposłuszne, Panie, dzieci Twoje 
 W szcześliwe czasy swoje 
Rzadko Cię wspominamy, 
Tylko rozkoszy zwykłych używamy. 
… 
Miej nas na wodzy, niech nas nie rozpycha 
 Docześna rozkosz licha. 
 Niechaj na Cię pomniemy 
Przynamniej w kaźni, gdy w łasce nie chcemy. 
 
(We Your wayward children 
 When fortunate 
 Lost in common pleasures 
Turn to You but rarely. 
… 
Hold tight the leash, Lord, 
 To curb our vain earthly joys; 
 May we, in torment, seek You 
When we will not in Grace.)4
                                                 
3 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 414, 424. 
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 In a contrite manner, Kochanowski recognized his part in the chief failing of 
humanity and the source of his grief. He, like other “wayward children” in “fortunate” 
times, had “lost” himself in the “common pleasures” that humanity’s arrogance had 
afforded him. It was his humanism that had bred this false pride, by teaching him to hold 
up high and praise the dignity of humanity and to look to the achievements of the ancient 
world for proof and affirmation. Looking to Cicero as his idol, Kochanowski had spared 
no verse or stanza of his poetry in singing of humanity’s desire to reach perfection and 
“pleasures” through the study of philosophy.5 This view of the world had proven 
inadequate when the death of his daughter came, and his grief soon followed. His 
humanism had helped foster a false impression of the Almighty’s role in the fortunes and 
tribulations of humanity. Kochanowski’s grief brought to the surface the inherent tension 
between reason and religious faith that the “ambivalence” of his humanism had covered.6  
He had forgotten that God, not humanity, held “tight the leash” of humanity’s fate. The 
life, death, and salvation of humanity remained solely in God’s will. Suffering had 
reminded Kochanowski of that, prompting him to “seek” His grace. Asking the 
“Lord…to curb” his and all of humanity’s “vain earthly joys,” Kochanowski made his 
final act of contrition and reaffirmation of faith to his “new” God.7
 
             
Wielkie przed Tobą są występy moje, 
 Lecz miłosierdzie Twoje 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Kochanowski, Treny, 42-43. 
5 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 412-414. 
6 Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism,” 58. 
7 Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance Manifesto,” 423-424. 
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 Przewyssza wszytki złości: 
Użyj dziś, Panie, nade mną litości. 
 
 
(I have greatly erred, 
 But Your benevolence 
 Outweighs my sins 
Grant me mercy now!)8
 
 
It was only when Kochanowski had placed himself and the fate of Orszula’s soul at the 
discretion of divine “mercy” that his grief ceased and his personal torment came to an 
end. His humanism had now become a relic of an almost forgettable past.     
 
Fig. 3. The 1583 Edition of Kochanowski’s Treny. 
 
Source: Janusz Pelc, Kochanowski: Szczyt renesansu w literaturze polskiej 
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), 528. 
                                                 
8 Kochanowski, Treny, 42-43. 
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Towards the middle of 1583, Jan shed his mourning clothes, bid farewell to his 
wife, unknowingly pregnant with his only son, and left Czarnolas for the last time. He 
traveled first to Krakow, where he arranged for the publication of several of his works, 
including a second printing of Treny.9 Towards the end of 1583, Kochanowski departed 
from Krakow with no clear destination in sight. He might have headed eastward to the 
city of Wilno in Lithuania to organize further publication of his works there. Or, perhaps 
Kochanowski visited his friend and patron Jan Zamoyski, a fellow humanist and 
chancellor of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the new, Renaissance-designed 
city of Zamosć in southeastern Poland.10
Perhaps he traveled simply to forget the scarring grief he had experienced in 
Czarnolas. After Treny, he never wrote another work of comparable poetic beauty and 
elegance, one matching the brilliance that his humanism had helped inspired in his 
previous compositions. On August 22 of 1584, Kochanowski died suddenly of an 
apparent heart attack in the southeastern Polish city of Lublin, finally, in the minds of his 
fellow Christians, joining the little girl who had once inspired the greatest poetic work of 
the Polish Renaissance. 
    
 
 
What does Kochanowski’s treatment of humanist consolation in Treny mean in 
the larger context of humanism and the Renaissance? Does his rejection of it, and 
subsequently his attachment to humanism, imply that Kochanowski was in fact not a 
                                                 
9 Pelc, Kochanowski, 132. 
10 Pelc, Kochanowski, 132-133. 
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member of this cosmopolitan European culture? On the contrary, his critique of humanist 
consolation, and the issues he raised throughout his work, places Jan Kochanowski firmly 
within this culture, attesting to his significance to Renaissance humanism in both Poland 
and Europe as a whole in two very important ways. 
 
Fig. 4. Zygmunt Trembecki’s Kochanowski with Orszula 
 
Source: Janusz Pelc, Kochanowski: Szczyt renesansu w literaturze polskiej 
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), 538 
 
The Treny are a significant contribution to our understanding of the humanist 
consolatory tradition of the Renaissance. In recording his personal experience of grief 
and parental bereavement, as well as his search for consolation, Kochanowski revealed 
himself to be a descendent of and a contributor to the humanist “art of mourning,” which 
traced its beginnings to Petrarch.11
                                                 
11 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 93. 
 Also, Kochanowski’s disillusionments with the 
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efficacy of classical philosophy in the humanist consolation in Treny reflect similar 
objections that other major humanists, such as Coluccio Salutati and Giannozzo Manetti, 
made in their consolatory works. For all three, the impracticality of the ancients’ wisdom 
(Stoic emotional impassivity to suffering above all) had heightened only the pains of 
human sorrow in trying to explain the unexplainable, the death of a child. Similarly, 
Kochanowski, Salutati, and Manetti’s solutions to grief found themselves a return to a 
purer form of Christian piety, free from the pollution of philosophy.12
In discussing the impact of philosophy and religion on him in Treny, 
Kochanowski echoed a larger debate of the Renaissance since the fourteenth century on 
the problem of human knowledge, on “the tension between faith and knowledge,” and the 
“relationship between God and the world.”
  
13 Knowledgeable with the writings and ideas 
of leading Renaissance thinkers such as Ficino and Pico, Kochanowski, like his humanist 
predecessors, had also reflected a “nearly unlimited faith in the power of the human mind 
and in humanistic ideals of life and culture” in his work initially.14 Philosophy, they all 
held, shielded humanity from the physical and mental harm of the world.  Yet, faced with 
worldly adversity and suffering, Kochanowski, again much like Pico and Ficino, turned 
against his philosophical and religious optimism of humanity, ending his humanist career 
“with renunciation” and “with a resigned return to religious dogma.”15
                                                 
12 McClure, Sorrow and Consolation, 93-108. 
 In a similar 
fashion, Kochanowski’s emphasis on the inability of humanity in practicing philosophy 
13 Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi (New 
York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1963), 61-63. 
14 Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos, 62. 
15 Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos, 62-63. Also see Weintraub, “Kochanowski’s Renaissance 
Manifesto,” 420. 
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consistently in Treny mirrored a sentiment in the writings of his contemporary, Michel de 
Montaigne.16
Like many of these humanists, as well as others, Kochanowski saw his 
philosophical convictions in the strength and dignity of humanity crump in the face of 
adversity. After Orszula’s death, his intellectual future with humanism seemed to have 
died too. Yet, with the Treny, his story of grief, consolation, and humanism did not just 
echo the suffering of a bereaved Polish father, but also a European one as well.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See “That to philosophize is to learn to die," and "Of the inconsistency of our action," in The Complete 
Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 56-68, 239-244. 
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